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THE CLOSED RULE 
Michael Doran∗ 
The closed rule constitutes a critical component of managerial power in the 
contemporary House of Representatives and an increasingly important element 
of the legislative process.  Subject to approval by the full membership, the 
closed rule allows managers to block all amendments to a measure when 
bringing that measure to the floor.  Despite objections from the minority, both 
Republicans and Democrats regularly use the closed rule when in the majority, 
and rank-and-file members ordinarily approve any closed rule put to a floor 
vote.  Once rarely used, the closed rule has become managers’ preferred 
instrument for controlling the House floor agenda. 
This Article presents the first comprehensive analysis of the closed rule in 
the legal literature.  After situating the closed rule within its institutional and 
theoretical context, this Article examines the use of the closed rule by the 
Republican majority in the 109th Congress and the Democratic majority in the 
110th Congress.  The Article then undertakes both a positive and normative 
analysis.  The positive analysis generalizes three prominent accounts of the 
closed rule from political theory and argues that the closed rule can more 
accurately be understood as a broadly managerial instrument for maintaining 
order on the House floor.  The normative analysis identifies and discusses 
several undesirable effects of the closed rule—its tendency to increase 
legislative fragmentation and redundancy, its facilitation of third-party 
capture, and its weakening of bipartisan cooperation and compromise.  But the 
normative analysis rejects claims that the closed rule is inherently 
undemocratic, arguing instead that the closed rule represents a deliberate, 
rational, and legitimate attempt by the rank and file to locate the House at the 
optimal point between too much managerial power and outright chaos on the 
floor. 
                                                          
 ∗ Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  For comments and suggestions on earlier 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his diary entry for December 11, 1985, President Ronald Reagan 
recorded his frustration with the Republicans in the House of Representatives 
by using the coarsest language he could bring himself to put on paper.  After 
noting the Democratic Speaker’s acid comment that the House Republicans 
“had ‘humiliated the man who led them to victory’ (me),” he bitterly agreed: 
“d—n it they had.”1  Earlier that day, the Republicans had rebelled against the 
President and joined a coalition of Democrats to defeat House Resolution 336, 
which would have provided for consideration of the President’s tax-reform 
measure on the House floor.2  That outcome was remarkable.  Measures such 
as House Resolution 336—known as “special rules” or simply “rules”—rarely 
fail in the House.  Special rules establish the conditions for bringing 
controversial legislation to the House floor, and they reflect the considered 
judgment and determined will of House managers.  In this case, the special rule 
also reflected President Reagan’s cooperation with the Democratic majority on 
tax reform, and he rightly understood defeat of the resolution as an affront to 
his own leadership.3 
House Resolution 336 set out a “modified closed rule”—that is, a special 
rule allowing “a very limited number of amendments”4—for what would be the 
most extensive reform of the nation’s tax laws in three decades.  During debate 
on the resolution, members objected that the special rule allowed only three 
floor amendments—two “perfecting amendments” offered by Democrats and 
one “amendment in the nature of a substitute” offered by Republicans.5  In 
effect, House Resolution 336 provided a carefully structured and deliberately 
                                                          
 1  RONALD REAGAN, THE REAGAN DIARIES 376 (Douglas Brinkley ed., 2007).  The bowdlerized entry is 
not unusual in the diaries; President Reagan apparently was not one to turn the page blue. 
 2 The vote was 202 to 223.  131 CONG. REC. 35,957 (1985). 
 3 After the vote on the resolution, the Speaker reportedly said to an aide that the defeat made the 
President “a lame duck on the floor of the House.”  JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN 
AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 165 (1987).  But 
the President’s setback did not endure; during its next session, Congress passed the tax-reform measure.  See 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 
U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 46 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.).  The 
glow of that victory did not endure either.  Just over two weeks after he signed the tax-reform measure, the 
press broke what President Reagan, again writing in his diary, at first called “a wild story” about his 
Administration selling arms to Iran in exchange for hostages held in Lebanon.  REAGAN, supra note 1, at 448. 
 4 These remarks are the characterization of House Resolution 336 made by its sponsor.  131 CONG. REC. 
35,945 (1985) (remarks of Rep. Bonior). 
 5 See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 35,948 (1985) (remarks of Rep. Lott and Rep. Kemp); id. at 35,949 
(remarks of Rep. Wolf); id. at 35,951 (remarks of Rep. Taylor); id. at 35,952 (remarks of Rep. Miller and Rep. 
Traficant); id. at 35,954 (remarks of Rep. Green). 
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controlled set of choices for the House floor: members could accept the tax-
reform measure as approved by the House Committee on Ways and Means;6 
members could accept the Ways and Means measure as modified by either or 
both of the Democratic amendments; members could accept the Republican 
substitute measure;7 or members could retain the status quo by rejecting both 
the Ways and Means measure and the Republican substitute measure.  Under 
the resolution, rank-and-file members could not offer any amendments beyond 
those that the resolution specifically permitted.8  Passage of House Resolution 
336 by the full House generally would have “closed” the tax-reform measure 
to amendment on the floor.9 
The defeat of House Resolution 336 was exceptional, but the intended 
effect of the rule—to define the floor choices available to members—was 
entirely familiar.  For decades, the House Committee on Rules has reported 
special rules that, once adopted by the full House, control the amendment 
process on the floor.  At one extreme, an “open rule” permits any floor 
amendment that satisfies the standing rules and precedents of the House.  At 
the other extreme, a “closed rule” prohibits all floor amendments.  Special 
rules falling between these extremes—often referred to as “structured rules,” 
“modified open rules,” or “modified closed rules”—allow certain amendments 
but disallow all others. 
The closed rule plays a critical role in the contemporary House.  For much 
of the twentieth century, open rules were the norm, and House managers 
reserved closed rules primarily for tax legislation.  But open rules, with their 
potential for disorder on the House floor, generally have fallen into disuse for 
consideration of controversial measures.  House managers now bring most 
such measures to the floor under a closed rule or, failing that, under a special 
                                                          
 6 House Resolution 336 also included a “self-executing” provision that would have treated a particular 
amendment as though it had been adopted.  That amendment was itself controversial.  See BIRNBAUM & 
MURRAY, supra note 3, at 162. 
 7 House Resolution 336 also allowed a specific perfecting amendment to the Republican substitute 
measure.  131 CONG. REC. 35,944 (1985). 
 8 In addition to the specific amendments that it allowed, House Resolution 336 made in order any 
“amendments to the bill recommended by the Committee on Ways and Means,” thereby allowing the chair of 
that committee to propose further changes on the floor.  Id. 
 9 President Reagan certainly knew what was at stake with House Resolution 336.  Four years earlier, 
House Republicans had joined a coalition of House Democrats to vote down a special rule that likely would 
have prevented passage of a tax measure that had been the highest domestic-policy priority of President 
Reagan’s first year in office.  R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 180–81 (1990); 
GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE 
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 117–18 (2005) [hereinafter COX & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA]. 
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rule that so tightly limits amending activity as to have nearly the same effect as 
a closed rule.10  Each closed rule must be put to a vote of the full House, but, 
with rare exceptions (such as the vote that galled President Reagan), the floor 
ratifies the closed rules proposed by managers.  The closed rule now 
constitutes one of the most important parts of the legislative process. 
Use of the closed rule elicits strong reactions from members of the 
minority.  When Republicans introduced the first special rule in 1883, 
Democrats called it “a monstrous proposition,” a “fraud,” and a 
“revolutionary” move.11  After the legislative reforms of the 1970s, the 
majority Democrats turned to closed and modified closed rules to manage an 
increasingly unruly House floor, and the minority Republicans denounced the 
development as undemocratic,12 “the most serious and scandalous blow struck 
against democratic procedures in the House to date,”13 and an occasion to 
“‘mourn . . . the freedoms we have lost.’”14  When Republicans held the 
majority in the 1990s and the 2000s, the minority Democrats complained that 
closed and modified closed rules, which they had been using with increasing 
frequency until they lost control of the House in 1995, were “an affront to the 
democratic process” and an “attack[] on democracy.”15  They charged that 
closed rules under Republican hegemony had led to “democracy’s utter 
collapse,”16 and they labeled the closed rule an “outrageous tactic[] that 
trample[s] the rights of the minority and rig[s] the rules of . . . debate.”17  
Although they too had used the closed rule regularly throughout their twelve 
years in the majority, the Republicans renewed their own attacks on the closed 
                                                          
 10 See infra Part II. 
 11 COMM. ON RULES, 97TH CONG., A HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES 63 (Comm. Print 1983) 
[hereinafter RULES COMMITTEE HISTORY]. 
 12 See 134 Cong. Rec. 12,179–80 (1988) (remarks of Rep. Lott, arguing that closed and modified closed 
rules exposed the minority “to the caprice of the majority leadership”). 
 13 Robert E. Bauman, Majority Tyranny in the House, in VIEW FROM THE CAPITOL DOME (LOOKING 
RIGHT) 11 (John H. Rousselot & Richard T. Schulze eds., 1980).  
 14 Stanley Bach, The Structure of Choice in the House of Representatives: The Impact of Complex 
Special Rules, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 553, 580 n.72 (1981) (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 5888 (1977) (remarks of 
Rep. Frenzel)). 
 15 The remarks, quoted in BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 171 (2007) [hereinafter SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING] (internal 
quotation marks omitted), were made by Representative Slaughter of New York in 2003.  Representative 
Slaughter apparently revised her views several years later.  As chair of the Rules Committee in the 110th 
Congress, she was responsible for bringing seventy-six closed rules to the floor.  See infra Part II.A.  
 16 H. RULES COMM. MINORITY OFFICE, 108TH CONG., BROKEN PROMISES: THE DEATH OF DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY 15 (2005), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Broken_Promises.pdf. 
 17 SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 189 (quoting Rep. Hoyer). 
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rule—calling it “offensive to the spirit of representative democracy”18—once 
the Democrats regained control of the House in 2007. 
Despite its increasingly important role in the legislative process and 
extensive study by political theorists and congressional scholars, the closed 
rule has received very little attention in the legal academic literature.19  This 
Article examines the closed rule in the contemporary House and analyzes its 
implications for the allocation of legislative power, the development of 
substantive policy, and the scope and character of representative democracy.  
As demonstrated here, the closed rule represents a rational decision by the rank 
and file to give managers broad discretionary authority over the House floor 
agenda.  That has important consequences for the House, for federal statutory 
law, and for government. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I situates the closed rule within its 
relevant institutional and theoretical context.  It shows, first, where the closed 
rule fits within the broader structure of House governance and procedure and, 
second, how the closed rule serves the function of agenda control, thereby 
contributing to the stability of legislative outcomes.  Part II examines in detail 
how the closed rule was used in two consecutive Congresses: the 109th 
Congress, which met from 2005 until 2007 under Republican control; and the 
110th Congress, which met from 2007 until 2009 under Democratic control.  It 
directly challenges two claims made by political scientists: that the closed rule 
is infrequently used and that a recent increase in the use of the closed rule is 
specific to Republican control of the House.  Part II shows that there is 
currently no appreciable difference between the use of the closed rule by a 
Republican majority and its use by a Democratic majority.  At this point, 
House managers from both parties employ the closed rule for approximately 
half of all controversial measures that they bring to the full membership. 
Part III undertakes a broader positive and normative examination of the 
closed rule.  Political scientists locate the closed rule in three different theories 
of legislative organization: distributive, informational, and partisan.  After 
reviewing how the experience with the closed rule in the 109th and 110th 
Congresses suggests possible qualifications to those explanations, Part III 
incorporates and generalizes the explanations into an account of the closed rule 
                                                          
 18 154 CONG. REC. 10,044 (2008) (remarks of Rep. Diaz-Balart). 
 19 References in the legal literature to the closed rule normally are made by way of background to 
specific federal statutes.  See, e.g., Michael Montaño, Note, Who May Be Tried Under the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006?, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1281, 1322 (2009). 
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as broadly managerial.  Part III then turns to a normative evaluation of whether 
the closed rule, so understood, should be reformed.  It argues that the closed 
rule has certain undesirable effects on substantive policy—that it leads to 
legislative fragmentation and redundancy, facilitates capture by interest groups 
and agents of the Executive Branch, and undermines bipartisan cooperation 
and compromise.  But Part III also rejects the more serious criticism that the 
closed rule is inherently undemocratic.  Instead, it argues that the closed rule 
represents a deliberate, rational, and legitimate effort by the rank and file to 
locate the House at the optimal point between too much managerial control and 
outright chaos on the floor.  Whether or not the rank and file are successful in 
this effort, the closed rule is not inherently less democratic than its polar 
opposite, the open rule. 
I. INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
The significance of the closed rule derives from the operation of basic 
House floor procedures and the importance of agenda control in legislative 
voting.  This Part sets out the institutional and theoretical background for 
understanding the use of the closed rule in the 109th and 110th Congresses and 
for assessing the broader implications of the closed rule for law and 
government. 
A. Overview of House Procedures 
The Constitution provides little detail about the internal structure of the 
House.  After vesting “[a]ll legislative Powers” in the House and the Senate, 
the Constitution sets the “Quorum to do Business” in the House at a simple 
majority of members and requires that the House choose a “Speaker and other 
Officers,” “keep a Journal of its Proceedings,” and record “the Yeas and  
Nays . . . on any question . . . at the Desire of one fifth of those Present.”20  
Beyond these and similar minima, the Constitution simply states that the 
House “may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”21 
The most salient “Rules of . . . Proceedings” are published at the beginning 
of each Congress as “standing rules” of the House.22  The standing rules 
                                                          
 20 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1–2, 5. 
 21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 22 The standing rules, which set out general House procedures, are distinct from special rules, which 
allow or facilitate floor consideration for individual measures.  See COMM. ON RULES, U.S. H.R., FLOOR 
PROCEDURE IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1999) [hereinafter FLOOR PROCEDURE], available at 
http://rules.house.gov/Archives/floor_man.htm.  The 111th Congress has adopted the most recent version of 
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describe the powers and duties of the speaker and other officers, designate 
committees and allocate jurisdiction among them, establish a regular order of 
business on the floor and procedures for overriding the regular order, set out 
floor debate and voting rules, and prescribe ethical standards for House 
members.23  The standing rules are supplemented by recorded precedents of 
parliamentarian decisions and by unwritten institutional norms.24 
Under these rules, precedents, and norms, the House organizes itself into a 
hierarchical structure that distinguishes between members serving as managers 
and members constituting the rank and file.  Managers—comprising the 
leadership of the majority party25 and the committee chairs26—exercise 
extensive control over the legislative process.27  They determine what policy 
issues the House will address, the content of specific measures reported out of 
committee, when measures will be brought to the floor, and the conditions for 
floor debate, amendment, and voting.28  Although it is possible for legislation 
to advance without the approval of House managers, that outcome is not 
common.  Managers cannot always secure passage of measures that they 
support, but they can almost always block passage of measures that they 
oppose.29 
                                                                                                                                      
the standing rules.  OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. H.R., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ONE 
HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS (2009) [hereinafter STANDING RULES].  The standing rules are reproduced in 
the “House Manual,” which also includes the Constitution and Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice.  
JUDY SCHNEIDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 98-262 GOV, HOUSE RULES MANUAL: SUMMARY OF 
CONTENTS (2007), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/98-262.pdf. 
 23 STANDING RULES, supra note 22, rs. I–II, X–XXI, XXIII–XXVII.  
 24 WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 6–7 (7th ed. 2007).  
For certain legislative matters (such as the budget), federal statutes provide additional rules of proceeding.  Id. 
at 7.  
 25 This includes the speaker, the majority leader, the majority whip, and the chair of the Rules Committee 
(among others). 
 26 The reference to “committee chairs” should be understood to include subcommittee chairs.  In both 
cases, a chair of a committee or a subcommittee of jurisdiction should be considered a manager only for 
measures that fall within that committee’s or subcommittee’s jurisdiction.  For example, the chair of the 
Committee on Agriculture would be a manager as to a farm measure but not as to a defense measure. 
 27 Although there is a parallel structure on the minority side—a minority leader, a minority whip, and 
ranking members of committees—the House’s strong commitment to majority rule generally is not consistent 
with considering those members to be “managers” as that term is used in this Article. 
 28 See generally SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15. 
 29 Since initiation of the discharge petition in 1931, only three measures discharged by petition from a 
House committee of jurisdiction have become law.  RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 
97-552 GOV, THE DISCHARGE RULE IN THE HOUSE: PRINCIPAL FEATURES AND USES 4–5 (2003); OLESZEK, 
supra note 24, at 144.  
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Managers hold their positions as agents of the full membership.30  The rank 
and file elect the managers and reserve authority to remove them,31 and the 
rank and file can change managers’ powers and duties by amending the 
standing rules.32  Such events are rare but momentous: in the “Cannon Revolt” 
of 1910, progressive Republicans joined Democrats to impose sharp limits on 
the powers of the speaker;33 in the early 1970s, the House made significant 
organizational changes to shift power from committee chairs to leadership and 
the rank and file;34 and, in 1998, the Republican majority effectively deposed 
Speaker Newt Gingrich.35  In the ordinary course, then, the rank and file 
delegate broad control over the legislative process to managers, but the rank 
and file retain the power to discipline managers through reversal of their 
decisions, contraction of their authority, or removal from their positions. 
Central to House management is the regulation of debate, amendment, and 
voting on the floor.  The 435 members of the House introduce thousands of 
bills and resolutions during each Congress,36 and granting every member 
unrestricted authority to call up any measure at any time would push the House 
into chaos.37  To avoid that outcome, the standing rules initially assign each 
measure to one or more committees38 and prescribe limited procedures for 
bringing a measure from committee to the floor.39  These two steps effectively 
block many measures from consideration by the full House—committees 
refuse or fail to report most measures referred to them, and leadership may 
decline to call up reported measures on the floor.40 
                                                          
 30 BARBARA SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, LEADERS, AND LAWMAKING: THE U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE POSTREFORM ERA 8–18 (1995) [hereinafter SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS]; see also 
STEVEN S. SMITH, CALL TO ORDER: FLOOR POLITICS IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 168, 234 (1989); Morris P. 
Fiorina & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Formal Theories of Leadership: Agents, Agenda Setters, and Entrepreneurs, in 
LEADERSHIP AND POLITICS: NEW PERSPECTIVES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 17, 20–21 (Bryan D. Jones ed., 1989).  
 31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; STANDING RULES, supra note 22, r. X; OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 21, 92; 
SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 64–67.  
 32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 33 Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, The Politics of the Contemporary House: From Gingrich 
to Pelosi, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 23, 24 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 9th ed. 
2005). 
 34 SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 110–11; SMITH, supra note 30, at 24–35. 
 35 Dodd & Oppenheimer, supra note 33, at 28.   
 36 OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 79.  
 37 SMITH, supra note 30, at 253. 
 38 STANDING RULES, supra note 22, rs. X & XII. 
 39 Id. rs. XIII−XVI. 
 40 OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 90–91.  In both cases, however, the measure is subject to discharge by 
petition of a majority of the full membership.  STANDING RULES, supra note 22, r. XV; OLESZEK, supra note 
24, at 143–46.  See generally BETH, supra note 29.  
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A measure approved by committee and by leadership can be brought to the 
floor under one of four main procedures: the regular order of business, 
unanimous consent, suspension of the rules, or a special rule.41  For the regular 
order of business, the standing rules distinguish between privileged and non-
privileged measures.42  Privileged measures (such as appropriations measures) 
can be called up on the floor at any time.43  Non-privileged measures can be 
called up by chronological position on one of the House calendars or under a 
weekly “call of committees.”44  But the House normally does not use the 
regular order.45  The unanimous-consent procedure is practicable only for non-
controversial measures because, as the term implies, a single member can 
defeat the procedure.46  Suspension of the rules allows for expeditious 
consideration.  A measure called up under the suspension procedure is 
debatable for only forty minutes, is not subject to amendment (other than by 
the member who calls it up), and requires a two-thirds vote for passage.47  
                                                          
 41 WM. HOLMES BROWN & CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE RULES, 
PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 857 (2003) [hereinafter HOUSE PRACTICE]; see also Methods of 
Obtaining House Floor Consideration, PARLIAMENTARY OUTREACH PROGRAM, COMM. ON RULES, U.S. H.R., 
http://www.rules.house.gov/POP/obt_floor_consid.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (explaining procedures for 
bringing measures to the House floor).  There are separate procedures for bringing discharged measures and 
private measures to the floor.  Id.  
 42 STANDING RULES, supra note 22, rs. XIII−XIV.  Rule XIV sets forth the daily order of business, and 
Rule XIII grants certain committees privilege to report certain measures.  A measure called up through the 
regular order generally is debatable only for one hour and is subject to amendment only by the member who 
calls up the measure.  CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 95-563, THE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ON THE HOUSE FLOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 4 (2006).  The standing rules require, 
however, that most tax or spending measures first be considered in the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union (the “Committee of the Whole”).  STANDING RULES, supra note 22, r. XVIII.  The 
Committee of the Whole—which also considers other measures, either by motion or by special rule—
comprises the full membership of the House but allows for more flexible debate and amendment procedures 
than does the House.  OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 156–58.  Any measure passed in the Committee of the 
Whole must pass in the House as well.  Id. at 180; see also DAVIS, supra, at 6.  For background on the 
Committee of the Whole, see STANLEY BACH, THE AMENDING PROCESS IN CONGRESS 23–40 (2003).  
 43 STANDING RULES, supra note 22, r. XIII, XXII; JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER 
CODE RS20067, HOW MEASURES ARE BROUGHT TO THE HOUSE FLOOR: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 2−3 (2005); 
OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 122.  
 44 STANDING RULES, supra note 22, rs. XIV−XV; SATURNO, supra note 43, at 4; OLESZEK, supra note 
24, at 115, 125−26, 146; SMITH, supra note 30, at 253. 
 45 SATURNO, supra note 43, at 4; STANLEY BACH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SPECIAL RULES IN THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1 (1991); OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 146.  
 46 ELIZABETH RYBICKI & STANLEY BACH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 97-236 GOV, FLOOR 
PROCEDURE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 2 (2003); OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 
116. 
 47 STANDING RULES, supra note 22, r. XV; SATURNO, supra note 43, at 4−5; OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 
118.  See generally ELIZABETH RYBICKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 98-314, SUSPENSION OF THE 
RULES IN THE HOUSE: PRINCIPAL FEATURES (2006) (explaining suspension procedure); THOMAS P. CARR, 
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Although the House passes many measures under the suspension procedure, 
the supermajority requirement limits its usefulness.48  By default, then, non-
privileged controversial measures—those measures that lack privileged status 
under the standing rules and that do not have unanimous or supermajority 
support—require a special rule for successful floor consideration.49 
B. Special Rules and the Rules Committee 
This need for a special rule allows the Rules Committee, acting on behalf 
of leadership, to control floor access when measures are too divisive for the 
unanimous-consent and suspension procedures.50  The Rules Committee stands 
between the committees of jurisdiction and the floor.  By reporting a special 
rule, the Rules Committee can make a non-privileged measure “in order” for 
floor consideration51 and can waive points of order that otherwise might be 
raised on the floor against a measure, whether or not the measure is 
privileged.52  A special rule can also allow or disallow any floor amendment to 
any measure.53  For these reasons, the special rule is often the procedure of 
choice—and, sometimes, of necessity—for bringing a privileged or non-
privileged measure to the full House. 
In the past, the Rules Committee regularly used its gatekeeper role to block 
measures without regard to the preferences of leadership or the rank and file.54  
That practice was most prominent during the “committee era” that ran from 
1910 through the early 1970s, although the rank and file began to curb the 
practice as early as 1961.55  Over the last three decades, however, the Rules 
                                                                                                                                      
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RL 32474, SUSPENSION OF THE RULES IN THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES (2005) (same).  Because a measure brought up under the suspension procedure cannot be 
amended other than by the member making the suspension motion, the procedure effectively acts as a closed 
rule with a supermajority requirement.  KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 155 
(1991) [hereinafter KREHBIEL, INFORMATION].  
 48 OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 118; SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 23−25. 
 49 BACH, supra note 45, at viii; OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 123; SMITH, supra note 30, at 259.   
 50 JAMES A. ROBINSON, THE HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE 1–2 (1963). 
 51 See generally RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 98-354 GOV, HOW SPECIAL 
RULES REGULATE CALLING UP MEASURES FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE HOUSE (2005). 
 52 See generally JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 98-433 GOV, SPECIAL 
RULES AND WAIVERS OF HOUSE RULES (2007). 
 53 See generally JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 98-612 GOV, SPECIAL 
RULES AND OPTIONS FOR REGULATING THE AMENDING PROCESS (2006).  
 54 ROBINSON, supra note 50, at 23−42; SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 26.  For an account of 
how the chair of the Rules Committee obstructed floor consideration of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 
Nicole L. Guéron, Note, An Idea Whose Time Has Come: A Comparative Procedural History of the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1960, 1964, and 1991, 104 YALE L.J. 1201, 1229 (1995). 
 55 RULES COMMITTEE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 187–95; ROBINSON, supra note 50, at 71−80. 
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Committee has fallen under the firm control of leadership, and leadership 
maintains that control through the speaker’s power to appoint and remove the 
majority-party members of the committee.56  Thus, in the contemporary House, 
the special rule enables leadership, acting through the Rules Committee, to 
control when and how important measures reach the floor. 
As a formal matter, the chair of a committee that has reported a measure 
ordinarily requests that the Rules Committee issue a special rule for the 
measure.57  The Rules Committee then reviews submissions and testimony 
from House members (including those not serving on the reporting committee) 
concerning what type of special rule members consider appropriate and the 
amendments members want to offer on the floor.58  In close consultation with 
leadership, the Rules Committee reports (or decides not to report) a resolution 
setting forth the special rule.59  This resolution is privileged for floor 
consideration and generally cannot be amended.60  Upon passage of the 
resolution by a majority vote, the special rule controls the floor procedure for 
the underlying measure.61  The House almost always approves the special rules 
put before it.62 
House Resolution 587 in the 111th Congress, which set out the special rule 
for the June 2009 floor consideration of the “cap-and-trade” energy legislation, 
provides a useful example.63  The resolution made consideration of the 
                                                          
 56 See OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 125; ROBINSON, supra note 50, at 78; SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra 
note 30, at 71, 314; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, The Rules Committee: New Arm of Leadership in a Decentralized 
House, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 96, 96−105 (1977); Steven S. Smith & Gerald Gamm, The Dynamics of 
Party Government in Congress, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 33, at 141.  Leadership’s control 
may have begun to erode the committee’s institutional prestige.  See James M. Curry & Jill L. Gloekler, I’m 
Your Puppet: The Changing Role of the House Committee on Rules (APSA Toronto Meeting Paper, Working 
Paper, 2009), available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/jcurry/docs/curry_gloekler_rules.pdf.  
 57 BACH, supra note 45, at 139−40; RULES COMMITTEE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 10; HOUSE PRACTICE, 
supra note 41, at 859; SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 150. 
 58 See generally JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 98-313 GOV, HOUSE RULES 
COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON SPECIAL RULES (2006); see also FLOOR PROCEDURE, supra note 22. 
 59 FLOOR PROCEDURE, supra note 22. 
 60 BACH, supra note 45, at 143−44; HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 41, at 861−64.  However, if the House 
rejects the motion for the previous question (that is, the motion to proceed to a vote on final passage) for a 
special rule, control over the rule passes to a member who opposed the motion.  BACH, supra note 45, at 40, 
144; HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 41, at 865.  
 61 FLOOR PROCEDURE, supra note 22. 
 62 BACH, supra note 45, at 2−3; OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 142; SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, 
supra note 15, at 36−37. 
 63 H.R. Res. 587, 111th Cong. (2009).  Appendix 1 sets forth the text of the resolution. 
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otherwise non-privileged measure in order,64 set time limits for floor debate 
and designated the “floor managers” to control the debate,65 and generally 
waived possible points of order that opponents might have raised to block the 
measure.66  The resolution also included a “self-executing” provision that 
replaced the cap-and-trade measure reported by the committee of jurisdiction 
with a substitute measure, as further modified by amendments set out in the 
resolution.67  Finally, the resolution tightly controlled the amending process on 
the floor by allowing only one member to offer only one amendment, thereby 
disallowing more than two hundred other amendments that members wanted to 
offer.68 
Special rules provide leadership with a wide range of possibilities for 
controlling the amendment process on the floor.  The most permissive special 
rule is the open rule, which allows any amendment that satisfies the precedents 
and the standing rules of the House.69  When it provides an open rule, 
leadership effectively disclaims tight control over floor amendments.70  By 
contrast, the closed rule maximizes leadership control over the amendment 
                                                          
 64 Specifically, House Resolution 587 provides that “upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in 
order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 2454) to create clean energy jobs, achieve energy independence, 
reduce global warming pollution and transition to a clean economy.”  Id.    
 65 House Resolution 587 allows “three hours of debate, with two and one-half hours equally divided and 
controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Energy and Commerce and 30 
minutes equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Ways 
and Means.”  Id. 
 66 House Resolution 587 waives “[a]ll points of order against consideration of the bill . . . except those 
arising under clause 9 [requiring the disclosure of earmarks] or 10 [requiring that any measure increasing the 
federal deficit be offset by a tax increase or spending decrease] of rule XXI.”  Id. 
 67 House Resolution 587 provides that “[i]n lieu of the amendment recommended by the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce now printed in the bill, an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text 
of H.R. 2998, modified by the amendment printed in part A of the report of the Committee on Rules 
accompanying this resolution, shall be considered as adopted.”  Id.  As special rules commonly do, House 
Resolution 587 also treats the “previous question . . . as ordered on the bill,”  eliminating the need to move for 
a vote on final passage for the underlying measure.  Id.  For a discussion of “self-executing rules,” see 
OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 137−38. 
 68 House Resolution 587 makes in order (in addition to the amendments treated as adopted by the 
resolution) a “further amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in part B of the report of the Committee 
on Rules, if offered by Representative Forbes of Virginia or his designee, which shall be . . . separately 
debatable for 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent.”  H.R. Res. 587.   
 69 SATURNO, supra note 53, at 1; BACH, supra note 45, at 9−17. 
 70 There are variants on the open rule, including one that requires amendments to be preprinted in the 
Congressional Record.  HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 41, at 868.  That variant generally is justified as giving 
members an opportunity to study amendments before they are offered.  For that reason, however, it also 
eliminates the tactical advantage of offering a surprise amendment. 
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process; a completely closed rule precludes all floor amendments.71  Between 
these extremes are special rules that permit certain amendments but prohibit 
others.  In the past, the Rules Committee often designated these as “modified 
open rules” or “modified closed rules,” depending on whether the committee 
judged the rule to be more open than closed or more closed than open.72  In 
recent years, the Rules Committee generally has preferred the bland and 
uninformative term “structured rules” for special rules that are not completely 
closed.73 
However, many special rules designated as “structured” are so restrictive 
that they effectively close off the floor amendment process.  The special rule 
for the cap-and-trade measure, although called a “structured rule” by the Rules 
Committee, allowed only one out of more than two hundred amendments 
submitted to the committee,74 and that one amendment proposed a weak 
substitute measure that lacked formal support even among the senior members 
of the minority.75  In effect, House managers handpicked the amendment for 
floor consideration so that the minority could offer an alternative measure 
                                                          
 71 SATURNO, supra note 53, at 2; BACH, supra note 45, at 39−46.  A closed rule nonetheless usually 
allows the minority to offer one amendment by way of a motion to recommit the measure with instructions.  
Such a motion, if successful, sends the underlying measure back to the substantive committee and directs the 
committee to return the measure immediately to the floor with whatever changes are set forth in the motion to 
recommit.  In short, the motion to recommit with instructions has the effect of amending the underlying 
measure.  The standing rules do not allow the Rules Committee to report a special rule that prevents the 
minority from offering a motion to recommit.  STANDING RULES, supra note 22, r. XIII, cl. 6(c); SATURNO, 
supra note 53, at 2; HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 41, at 858. 
 72 DAVIS, supra note 42, at 9; SATURNO, supra note 53, at 1−2.  For example, House Resolution 336, the 
special rule on which the Republicans in the House rebelled against President Reagan, allowed only three floor 
amendments and was designated by the Rules Committee as a “modified closed rule.”  H.R. Res. 336, 99th 
Cong. (1985); see also supra note 4. 
 73 OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 133.  Both academic and non-academic commentators often use the term 
“restrictive rule” to refer to a special rule that is not labeled as either open or closed.  See, e.g., BACH, supra 
note 45, at 6, 47−55.  But that term is not fully satisfactory.  In certain cases, a non-open rule may allow 
substantially all the amendments that members have submitted to the Rules Committee.  A rule with such 
minimal limitations on floor amendments should not be regarded as restrictive.  Additionally, a rule that 
commentators might designate as restrictive could allow so few amendments that it really should be regarded 
as a closed rule.  And even a restrictive rule allowing votes on several versions of a measure might effectively 
constrain floor outcomes through a “king-of-the-hill” or “queen-of-the-hill” voting procedure.  Those 
procedures typically ensure that the version preferred by the Rules Committee will prevail.  See BACH, supra 
note 45, at 57−70; OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 138−40. 
 74 Summary of Amendments Submitted to the Rules Committee for H.R. 2454—American Clean Energy 
and Security Act of 2009, COMM. ON RULES, U.S. H.R. (June 25, 2009, 4:58 PM) http://www.rules.house.gov/ 
amendment_details.aspx?NewsID=4341. 
 75 Rep. Forbes of Virginia offered an amendment to The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 
2009, H.R. 2454, 155 Cong. Rec. H7672–7680 (daily ed. June 26, 2009), which was defeated by a roll call 
vote of 172 to 256, with 5 representatives not voting.  Id. at H7685. 
DORAN GALLEYSFINAL 10/5/2010  8:13 AM 
2010] THE CLOSED RULE 1377 
posing no genuine risk of adoption by the full House.  A special rule that so 
sharply limits the amendment process is a closed rule in all but name.  To 
account accurately, then, for special rules during the 109th and 110th 
Congresses, this Article adopts the following classifications: “open rule” 
designates a rule that allows all floor amendments without any preselection by 
the Rules Committee; “closed rule” designates a special rule that allows no 
floor amendments; “effectively closed rule” designates a special rule that 
allows substantially no floor amendments; and “limiting rule” designates any 
other special rule, whether it leans more toward the open side or more toward 
the closed side.76 
Before the 1980s, the Rules Committee issued very few closed rules during 
each Congress.77  Members of both parties generally accepted that tax 
measures would come to the floor under closed rules because it was thought 
that difficult compromises made in the Ways and Means Committee might 
easily unravel under an open amendment process.78  The Rules Committee also 
protected many of the measures passed during the first 100 days of President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s first term with closed rules.79  But those and similar uses 
of the closed rule were considered exceptional; for the most part, the House 
historically maintained an open process for floor amendments.80  In the last 
three decades, however, the majority in the House has greatly increased its use 
of the closed rule, despite protests from the minority.81  And, during periods 
when the majority has set it aside, the minority has effectively justified the 
                                                          
 76 More specifically, a rule is designated as “effectively closed” if it both allows three or fewer 
amendments and disallows more than half the amendments submitted to the Rules Committee.  Any rule (other 
than a closed rule or an effectively closed rule) will be designated as “limiting” if it preselects the amendments 
that may be offered on the floor.  Thus, a rule may be designated as “limiting” even if it allows all or 
substantially all the amendments submitted to the Rules Committee.  In such cases, the Rules Committee 
exercises agenda control by preselecting the amendments that may be offered and by precluding an open 
amendment process.  Finally, a rule will be designated as “open” even if it requires that amendments be 
preprinted in the Congressional Record (or if it gives priority to such amendments). 
 77 ROBINSON, supra note 50 at 44−45. 
 78 John C. Blydenburgh, The Closed Rule and the Paradox of Voting, 33 J. POL. 57, 57–58 (1971); see 
also RULES COMMITTEE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 14; ROBINSON, supra note 50, at 44–45.  President Herbert 
Hoover blamed the defeat of a measure setting out his 1932 tax proposals on Speaker John Nance Garner’s 
decision to bring the measure to the floor under an open rule.  HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT 
HOOVER: THE GREAT DEPRESSION 137–38, 160 (1952). 
 79 RULES COMMITTEE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 126–27. 
 80 BACH, supra note 14, at 567. 
 81 OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 129; SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 26; SMITH, 
supra note 30, at 74−75, 188−90; see also infra Part II. 
DORAN GALLEYSFINAL 10/5/2010  8:13 AM 
1378 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
majority’s reliance on the closed rule by offering numerous floor amendments 
intended to delay or prevent passage of the majority’s legislative program.82 
The immediate practical effect of the closed rule is straightforward: a 
measure called up under a closed rule is put to a simple up-or-down vote 
before the full House.  Thus, the closed rule allows House managers first to 
determine the exact terms of the measure and then to pair the measure against 
the status quo.  The closed rule bars competing versions of the measure, 
including versions that a majority of the rank and file might prefer to the 
version called up by managers.  In short, the closed rule constitutes an 
important tool for House managers to set the floor agenda. 
C. Agenda Control Under the Closed Rule 
Political theory has long recognized the possibility that an agenda setter 
may influence—and, in certain cases, control—voting outcomes.83  The agenda 
setter for a committee or a legislature may determine which policy options will 
be put to a vote, which options will be excluded from consideration, the order 
of voting on different options, the time allowed for consideration of each 
option, and whether other committee members or legislators can propose 
amendments to the options prior to voting.  House managers, acting as agents 
of the rank and file, exercise this agenda-setting role through their control over 
the content of measures reported by the committees of jurisdiction and their 
control over the special rules under which measures reach the floor.  The 
closed rule represents the most ambitious reach of managerial agenda setting 
and the point at which control over the floor agenda most closely approaches 
control over voting outcomes. 
Agenda control in the House can be separated into two dimensions: spatial 
agenda control (a topic much discussed by political theory) and temporal 
agenda control (a topic less discussed by political theory).  House managers 
control the spatial agenda by determining the content of measures and 
amendments brought to the floor and by deciding voting order and amendment 
procedures.  They control the temporal agenda by regulating how many 
                                                          
 82 SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 29, 39, 112.  
 83 WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF 
DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 137–39, 169–95, 200, 237 (1982).  More generally, 
legislative process helps to determine legislative outcomes.  KREHBIEL, INFORMATION, supra note 47, at 1–2, 
151; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547–48 (1983); Charles J. 
Finocchiaro & David W. Rohde, War for the Floor: Partisan Theory and Agenda Control in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, 33 LEG. STUD. Q. 35, 37 (2008). 
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amendments may be offered and the time available for debate on those 
amendments.  In both cases, the ability to control floor activity encourages 
managers to make heavy use of the closed rule. 
Managers setting the spatial agenda can facilitate passage of their preferred 
measures over competing measures, even those that stand closer to the floor 
median.  To see this possibility in a simple case, consider the familiar problem 
of the Condorcet paradox, which demonstrates that social preferences may be 
intransitive even though individual preferences are transitive.84  Assume, for 
example, that the members—A, B, and C—of a three-member committee have 
preferences among three competing policy options—x, y, and z—as shown 
below (in declining order).85 
Table 1 




























The principle of straightforward majority rule among paired options, if 
implemented without restriction, will prevent the committee from selecting any 
one of the three options.  In pairwise voting between option x and option y, 
option x would win (members A and B would vote for it).  But in pairwise 
voting between option x and option z, option z would win (members B and C 
would vote for it), and in pairwise voting between option y and option z, option 
y would win (members A and C would vote for it).  Thus, whatever option 
wins in one round of voting will be defeated by a different option in a 
subsequent round of voting, and the committee will cycle indefinitely without 
settling on a winner.86 
                                                          
 84 PETER C. ORDESHOOK, A POLITICAL THEORY PRIMER 24−25 (1992). 
 85 These individual preferences are all assumed to be transitive, such that member A prefers option x to 
option z, member B prefers option z to option y, and member C prefers option y to option x. 
 86 This assumes that the members vote sincerely. 
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That indeterminate outcome is not inevitable.  A notable, although 
uncommon, exception occurs when the options include a Condorcet winner—
that is, an option that prevails over every other option in pairwise majority 
voting.87  The committee or legislature will always select the Condorcet winner 
if the Condorcet winner is not excluded from the voting process.88  However, 
Arrow’s Theorem indicates that, in the absence of a Condorcet winner, cycling 
is a general possibility for collective decision making,89 and McKelvey’s 
Theorem implies that virtually any available option can prevail.90 
Nonetheless, institutional structures in the legislature constrain such 
otherwise chaotic outcomes.91  A principal determinant of which option 
ultimately wins is voting order, and a principal determinant of voting order is 
the preference of the agenda setter.92  Assuming that all members of the 
committee or the legislature vote sincerely, the member who sets the voting 
agenda effectively may determine which option wins.93  Continuing with the 
example above, member B, if given the power to set the voting agenda, can 
ensure that option z (her preferred option) prevails by setting the voting order 
as follows: first, pairing option x against option y; then, pairing the winner 
against option z.  Under that voting order, option x would defeat option y in the 
first round (members A and B would vote for option x), and option z would 
defeat option x in the second round (members B and C would vote for option 
z).  Likewise, member A could set the agenda to ensure a victory for option x, 
and member C could do so to ensure a victory for option y.94 
                                                          
 87 ORDESHOOK, supra note 84, at 80–81.   
 88 Id. at 81. 
 89 See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); PETER C. 
ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 62 (1986).  A Condorcet winner 
does emerge in the case of unidimensional space and single-peaked preferences held by an odd number of 
voters.  RIKER, supra note 83 at 126; see also Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Positive Theories of 
Congressional Institutions, in POSITIVE THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS 5 (Kenneth A. Shepsle & 
Barry R. Weingast eds., 1995) [hereinafter Shepsle & Weingast, Positive Theories]. 
 90 Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for 
Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976); see also ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 76–82, 281–82; 
Fiorina & Shepsle, supra note 30, at 28–29. 
 91 See Keith Krehbiel, Spatial Models of Legislative Choice, 13 LEG. STUD. Q. 259 (1988) [hereinafter 
Krehbiel, Spatial Models]; Shepsle & Weingast, Positive Theories, supra note 89 at 8.  The relevant literature 
began with Shepsle’s classic article demonstrating that exogenous institutional mechanisms can produce stable 
legislative outcomes—what he called “structure-induced equilibrium.”  Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional 
Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 27 (1979). 
 92 See ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 65–66 (explaining effect of agenda-setting power on voting 
outcomes); RIKER, supra note 83, at 65, 69–73 (same); Fiorina & Shepsle, supra note 30, at 29 (same).  
 93 ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 65–66. 
 94 For simplicity of presentation, this example assumes that the members vote sincerely.  But assuming 
that the members vote strategically does not significantly change the result.  ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 
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Table 2 
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In the same manner, the authority of the closed rule allows House managers 
to influence or control voting outcomes.95  The closed rule enables managers to 
limit floor action to a simple pairwise vote of their selected version of any 
measure against the status quo, thereby blocking all competing versions of the 
measure from consideration.  At the extreme, managers can use the closed rule 
even to prevent floor consideration of a Condorcet winner.96  Consider another 
example, using a simple one-dimensional model.  Assume that the House is 
taking up immigration reform and that members have introduced three 
measures.  Measure 1 corresponds to the floor median; Measure 2, which is to 
the left of Measure 1, corresponds to the preferences of House managers and is 
the measure reported by the committee of jurisdiction; and Measure 3, which is 
                                                                                                                                      
281–83; Fiorina & Shepsle, supra note 30, at 30–31.  Also, political theory suggests that agenda control 
becomes more tenuous with incomplete and asymmetric information about the preferences of individual 
legislators.  ORDESHOOK, supra note 84, at 227–34.  House managers, however, mitigate such information 
problems through an extensive whip system.  See SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 116–35 
(explaining the House whip system).  
 95 As such, the closed rule is properly located among the institutional mechanisms that produce stability 
in the House.  See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative 
Choice, 37 PUBLIC CHOICE 503, 514 (1981); Shepsle, supra note 91, at 54–55.  This point was recognized 
even before Shepsle introduced the concept of “structure-induced equilibrium.”  See Blydenburg, supra note 
78.  It should be noted that even the open rule is embedded in particular institutional constraints on floor 
activity that stabilize outcomes (helping to prevent the outright chaos implied by McKelvey’s Theorem).  See 
generally Barry R. Weingast, Floor Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Committee Power Under the Open Rule, 
83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795 (1989) [hereinafter Weingast, Floor Behavior]. 
 96 There remains, however, the possibility that a Condorcet winner blocked by a closed rule may emerge 
as the floor winner if the minority offers the Condorcet winner in a motion to recommit with instructions.  See 
supra note 71.  For a broader argument that “negative agenda power”—the ability to block measures from 
floor consideration—constitutes a critical function of House managers, see COX & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE 
AGENDA, supra note 9, at 3–5, 37–197.  
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to the right of Measure 1, corresponds to the preference of a significant faction 
in the majority party. 
 
Measure 2            Measure 1                  Measure 3            status quo 
 (managers)        (floor median)                 (faction) 
             +                          +                                        +                      + 
             a                          b                                        c                       d 
 
Whip counts confirm that any of the three measures would defeat the status 
quo.  That is, the three measures all stand closer to the floor median than does 
the status quo (so: |a - b| < |b - d| and |b - c| < |b - d|).  The whip counts also 
confirm that, in pairwise voting, Measure 1 would defeat either Measure 2 or 
Measure 3 (because Measure 1 is the floor median) and that Measure 3 would 
defeat Measure 2 (so: |b - c| < |a - b|).97 
After the committee of jurisdiction reports Measure 2, leadership must 
determine what type of special rule the Rules Committee will report for the 
measure.  If Measure 2 comes to the floor under a rule allowing members to 
offer Measure 1 and Measure 3 as amendments, Measure 1 (as the floor 
median) will prevail.98  If Measure 2 comes to the floor under a rule allowing a 
member to offer Measure 3 but not Measure 1 as an amendment, Measure 3 
will prevail: it will first defeat Measure 2 and then will defeat the status quo.  
But if Measure 2 comes to the floor under a closed rule, Measure 2 will 
prevail: it will defeat the status quo in a simple pairwise vote.99  Using the 
closed rule in this case ensures that the House managers can protect Measure 2, 
their preferred version, from the two competing versions that otherwise would 
defeat it.100  And, in fact, House managers often use closed rules for precisely 
this purpose.101 
                                                          
 97 See JAMES M. ENELOW & MELVIN J. HINICH, THE SPATIAL THEORY OF VOTING: AN INTRODUCTION 8–
13 (1984) (explaining one-dimensional models of spatial voting).  
 98 Krehbiel, Spatial Models, supra note 91, at 305. 
 99 Id.  If Measure 2 comes to the floor under a closed rule, the minority can potentially secure passage of 
either Measure 1 or Measure 3 by offering Measure 1 or Measure 3 as a motion to recommit with instructions.  
See supra note 71.  
 100 Manager preferences on measures likely will reflect, in part, the preferences of the rank-and-file 
members of the majority party.  See generally COX & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA, supra note 9 
(arguing that party leaders aggregate and promote preferences of party rank and file).  Because the relationship 
between managers and the rank and file is an agency relationship, however, manager preferences likely 
diverge from the preferences of the majority-party rank and file in non-trivial respects.  See Fiorina & Shepsle, 
supra note 30, at 18–21 (discussing the principal’s difficulty in controlling an agent).  Of course, manager 
preferences do not always have sufficient support to prevail on the floor.  When the House initially passed its 
measure for health care reform on November 7, 2009, for example, the Democratic leadership determined that 
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The closed rule also facilitates control over the floor temporal agenda.  
Spatial voting models generally assume that a committee or legislature remains 
in session indefinitely, such that time presents no constraint on the passage of 
measures.102  However, the Constitution sets the duration of each Congress at 
two years, thereby fixing a temporal boundary on the authority of any one 
Congress to enact legislation.103  With thousands of measures introduced in 
each Congress, many of which are reported favorably by the committees of 
jurisdiction, floor time in the House is a scarce resource that must be allocated 
carefully among the measures making up the majority’s legislative program.  
The minority potentially can block passage of the last measures on the 
majority’s program by consuming so much floor time on the first measures that 
the constitutional time limit expires before the last measures reach the floor.  
Proposing, debating, and voting on floor amendments take time, and the 
minority may pursue amendments that have little or no prospect of passage 
simply to delay progress on the floor.104 
The closed rule enables House managers to block the dilatory floor moves 
of the minority.105  By preventing all floor amendments on a measure, the 
closed rule expedites floor consideration of the measure and conserves time.  
Even very complex legislation—such as the cap-and-trade measure passed by 
the House in June 2009—can be brought to the floor, debated, and passed 
within a few hours under the protection of a closed or effectively closed rule.  
Thus, by asserting control over the temporal agenda on the floor through the 
                                                                                                                                      
its preferred version—which did not include the strict limits on federal funding of abortions sought by a 
faction of the Democratic party—would not pass on the floor.  The leadership, therefore, allowed a floor 
amendment that included those limits.  David M. Herszenhorn & Jackie Calmes, Abortion Was at Heart of 
Wrangling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009, at A24.  Even then, however, House managers used an effectively 
closed rule for the measure to ensure that the floor amendment setting out the abortion funding limitations 
would be exactly as negotiated by the House managers and the faction seeking the limitations.  Id.  For further 
discussion of manager preferences, see infra note 283. 
 101 John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, Congressional Committees in a Partisan Era, in CONGRESS 
RECONSIDERED 249, 253–54 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 8th ed. 2005); see also 
STANLEY BACH & STEVEN S. SMITH, MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 
ADAPTATION AND INNOVATION IN SPECIAL RULES 55, 57, 91 (1988); COX & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE 
AGENDA, supra note 9, at 126–27; OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 127; ORDESHOOK, supra note 84, at 79−80; 
SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 32–33, 70, 136–62, 219, 303; SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX 
LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 30−31, 112, 199, 203−04, 211; SMITH, supra note 30, at 76, 191; Dodd & 
Oppenheimer, supra note 33, at 49; Guéron, supra note 54, at 1211−12. 
 102 COX & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA, supra note 9, at 44. 
 103 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 104 BACH & SMITH, supra note 101, at 54; COX & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA, supra note 9, at 
55–56; SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 77–78; SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 
15, at 29; SMITH, supra note 30, at 36, 40. 
 105 Cf. SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 279. 
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closed rule, House managers ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that every 
measure on the majority’s legislative program will a reach final vote before the 
Congress expires.106 
The closed rule locates this control over both the spatial and temporal floor 
agenda in the managers as agents of the full House.  No one member among 
the managers holds control over the floor agenda to the exclusion of the other 
managers, and the managers as a group must submit each closed rule to the 
rank and file for ratification.  In the first instance, the chair of the committee of 
jurisdiction reporting a measure has extensive influence—and, often, outright 
control—over the substantive content of the measure.107  Once the measure 
leaves the committee of jurisdiction, other managers—particularly the 
members of the majority-party leadership—may or may not rewrite the 
measure before bringing it to the floor.108  In any event, those managers decide 
whether to honor a request from the chair of the reporting committee to call up 
the measure under a rule disallowing floor amendments.109  By using the 
closed rule, managers ensure that the version of the measure approved by the 
committee chair and by leadership will be put to a vote on final passage and 
that the vote cannot be delayed by floor amendments.  In short, the spatial and 
temporal agenda control that the closed rule grants to House managers is 
shared among the managers.110 
Still, this managerial control is not absolute.  The chair of the reporting 
committee and the leadership decide together on the policy content of a 
measure and decide to call it up under a closed rule, but the closed rule itself 
must be approved by a majority vote of the full House.111  The rank and file 
thus retain the power to reject the floor agenda proposed by managers.  But 
that point should not be overstated.  In general, the rank and file exercise 
                                                          
 106 See infra Part II.B.  Democratic managers used the closed rule to control the temporal agenda on the 
floor during the self-imposed “100 Hours” time limit at the beginning of the 110th Congress.  See OLESZEK, 
supra note 24, at 139; SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 286−87.  Similarly, Republican 
managers used the closed rule to control the temporal agenda on the floor during consideration of the 
“Contract with America” legislation.  SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 29.  
 107 OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 89−107. 
 108 SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 20−23. 
 109 OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 123−28. 
 
110
 However, the leadership, which holds the ultimate influence over the decisions of the Rules 
Committee, likely enjoys a much larger share of that agenda control than does the chair of the reporting 
committee.  For an account of agenda-setting power as a “cartel” controlled by House managers, see COX & 
MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA, supra note 9, at 9. 
 111 OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 155−56; cf. Fiorina & Shepsle, supra note 30, at 31–32 (arguing that a 
“full-blown theory of agenda setting” should account for “the institutional constraints (incentives and 
monitoring) that followers impose on their leaders in their agenda-setting activities”).  
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limited oversight over managerial decisions to use the closed rule; outright 
rejection of a special rule of any kind—whether or not closed—is very rare.112  
Voting down a rule is understood as a sharp rebuke to House managers.  It was 
for this reason that President Reagan, after cooperating with the Democratic 
managers of the House to advance his tax-reform measure, felt “humiliated” 
when House Republicans engineered a floor defeat of the modified closed rule 
for the measure.113  The requirement that House managers obtain ratification of 
a closed rule on the floor thus presents only a weak constraint on their use of 
the closed rule.  Although managerial power over the spatial and temporal 
agenda on the floor is held in an agency relationship, the rank and file, as 
principals, grant managers significant latitude in using that power.114 
II. THE CLOSED RULE IN THE 109TH AND 110TH CONGRESSES 
The closed rule provides House managers with a potentially important 
instrument for agenda control, but that does not necessarily imply that 
managers use the closed rule for that purpose.  The standard claim in the 
academic literature is that House managers normally exercise their agenda 
                                                          
 112 OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 155−56.  Consider, for example, the voting outcomes associated with the 
initial attempt to pass the economic bailout measure in the House during the fall of 2008: the full membership 
approved the special rule for consideration of the measure by a vote of 220-198 and then defeated the measure 
itself by a vote of 205-228.  154 CONG. REC. H10335, H10410 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2008).  
 113 See supra Introduction; see also OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 142. 
 114 This Article generally does not consider the Senate, and it thereby sets aside important questions that 
would have to be addressed in considering agenda control within Congress as a whole.  The Senate does not 
have a closed rule, and agenda control in the Senate generally is exercised through ad hoc unanimous consent 
agreements (which obviously require the approval of all senators).  OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 203–11.  One 
might argue that legislative processes in the Senate provide a natural experiment for considering the effect of 
the closed rule in the House.  In other words, one might argue that what happens in the Senate is suggestive of 
what would happen in the House absent the closed rule and that, accordingly, claims about the closed rule can 
be tested by reference to the Senate.  But the comparison does not hold.  The Senate and the House differ in 
several important respects apart from the closed rule.  First, the Senate, unlike the House, is not organized 
around the principle of simple majority rule.  The de facto need for a supermajority of senators on many 
measures normally means that the majority party cannot assume that it will have its way on the floor.  Second, 
the Senate recognizes substantially greater privileges for individual senators than does the House for its 
members.  Third, the Senate does not have the germaneness requirement that the House does for floor 
amendments; thus, an unwelcome amendment cannot be avoided in the Senate simply by refusing to call up a 
measure for which the unwelcome amendment would be in order.  Those points (and others) imply that the 
legislative proceedings in the Senate do not reliably reflect how the House would operate without the closed 
rule.  A Senate with a closed rule likely would have stronger managerial agenda control than does the current 
Senate, and a House without a closed rule likely would have weaker managerial agenda control than does the 
current House.  But a House without a closed rule likely would not look very much at all like the current 
Senate. 
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control through limiting rules rather than through closed rules.115  Many 
scholars writing before the Republicans took control of the House in 1995 
generally considered the closed rule to be of secondary importance; they 
considered the closed rule to be an exceptional instrument that managers 
largely had abandoned in favor of limiting rules.116  Even more recent analyses 
significantly understate the incidence of the closed rule.  For example, one 
prominent political scientist flatly maintained as late as 2003 that the closed 
rule “is seldom invoked.”117  In 2001, two scholars argued that “[c]urrently, 
some intermediate type of restrictive rule is used for most bills.”118  And, at the 
start of the 110th Congress, another political scientist acknowledged the 
increased use of the closed rule but attributed it to Republican hegemony in the 
House, arguing that “Republicans . . . made extremely restrictive floor 
procedures standard operating procedure, using closed rules much more 
frequently than Democrats ever did.”119  Similarly, legal academics have 
identified greater use of the closed rule with Republican control of the 
House.120 
This Part contests those claims.  It reviews the legislative record of the 
closed rule in the Republican House of the 109th Congress (2005 through 
2007) and the Democratic House of the 110th Congress (2007 through 2009).  
The comparison of back-to-back Congresses under different majorities 
establishes that House managers regularly use the closed rule for controversial 
measures and that there is no appreciable difference between Republicans and 
Democrats on this point.  This Part also shows the importance of the closed 
rule to managerial agenda control by establishing that the closed rule has a 
genuinely restrictive effect on the amending activity of the rank and file of 
both the minority and the majority, that managers in fact use the closed rule to 
                                                          
 115 Political scientists normally would refer to such rules as “restrictive rules.”  See, e.g., BACH & SMITH, 
supra note 101, at 50–74; supra note 73. 
 116 See, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 9, at 103; BACH & SMITH, supra note 101, at 55–57; SINCLAIR, 
LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 140–41, 161.   
 117 GERRY MACKIE, DEMOCRACY DEFENDED 170 (2003).   
 118 Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, 95 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 435 (2001).   
 119 SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 280; see also Dodd & Oppenheimer, supra 
note 33, at 49.  Even now, Sinclair continues to emphasize restrictive rules over closed rules.  Barbara Sinclair, 
Question: What’s Wrong with Congress?  Answer: It’s a Democratic Legislature, 89 B.U. L. REV. 387, 393 
(2009) (“Thus, special rules . . . that bar all amendments except those explicitly allowed by the . . . Rules 
Committee [i.e., limiting rules] have become routine.”). 
 120 Erica Rosenberg, Life Under the Republicans: The Subversion of Democracy in the House Resources 
Committee, 13 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 233, 243–45 (2007); Charles Tiefer, Congress’s 
Transformative ‘Republican Revolution’ in 2001–2006 and the Future of One-Party Rule, 23 J.L. & POL. 233, 
256–63 (2007). 
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control both the spatial agenda and the temporal agenda, and that the need for 
ratification of closed rules by rank-and-file members imposes only weak 
constraints on House managers. 
A. Counting the Closed Rules 
Consistent with longstanding practice, House managers brought up many 
of the measures passed during the 109th and 110th Congresses under the 
unanimous-consent and suspension-of-the-rules procedures.  Time is limited 
for each Congress,121 and floor time is a particularly scarce resource that 
managers must allocate with care.  Bringing a non-controversial measure to the 
floor for unanimous consent or by a motion to suspend the rules allows for 
quick disposition and, importantly, conserves floor time for measures that 
cannot win unanimous or supermajority support.  By contrast, managers in the 
109th and 110th Congresses brought controversial measures to the floor under 
special rules, and the type of special rule that they used most often was the 
closed rule. 
Members of the House introduced 8,152 measures during the 109th 
Congress, of which 1,277 passed.122  About half of the successful measures 
were passed by unanimous consent or by suspension of the rules;123 most of the 
remaining measures came to the floor under special rules reported by the Rules 
Committee or were themselves special rules.  Legislative activity in the 110th 
Congress was comparable, although the numbers were larger.  House members 
introduced 9,409 measures during the 110th Congress, of which 1,964 
passed.124  Again, approximately half of the successful measures were passed 
by unanimous consent or suspension of the rules,125 and most of the other 
successful measures came to the floor under special rules or were themselves 
special rules. 
During the 109th Congress, the Rules Committee reported 187 resolutions 
that, together, set forth 143 special rules.126  As shown in Table 3, the plurality 
                                                          
 121 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 122 These data were provided by the Georgetown Law Library.  All data are on file with the author. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See infra Appendix 2-A and note 337 (explaining that the Rules Committee also reported resolutions 
not bearing on the floor-amendment process, such as general debate rules and rules for consideration of 
conference reports). 
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of special rules, 38% of the total, were closed rules, and 50% of the special 
rules were either closed or effectively closed rules. 
Table 3 
Special Rules in the 109th Congress 
 
 







































The numbers are comparable for the 110th Congress.  The Rules Committee 
reported a total of 221 resolutions, setting forth 185 special rules.127  As shown 
in Table 4, the plurality of special rules, 41%, were closed rules, and 54% of 
the special rules were either closed or effectively closed rules. 
                                                          
 127 See infra Appendix 3-A and note 358 (explaining that the Rules Committee also reported resolutions 
not bearing on the floor-amendment process, such as general debate rules and rules for consideration of 
conference reports). 
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Table 4 
Special Rules in the 110th Congress 
 
 







































Thus, in both the Republican House of the 109th Congress and the 
Democratic House of the 110th Congress, fully half of all controversial 
measures—those that could not be brought to the floor for unanimous consent 
or under suspension of the rules—were called up under rules that prevented or 
effectively prevented the rank and file from offering floor amendments.  In 
each of those cases, House managers paired their selected version of a measure 
against the status quo in a simple up-or-down vote.128  The rank and file could 
accept or reject the measure as proposed by House managers, but they could 
not modify it. 
The prominence of the closed rule during these two Congresses is 
underscored by locating it within the full spectrum of special rules.  Well under 
one-fifth of the special rules during this period—16% in the 109th Congress 
and 12% in the 110th Congress—were entirely open to floor amendments.  
Between the extremes of the completely closed rules and the completely open 
rules, most special rules imposed moderate or severe limitations on floor 
amendments.  The effectively closed rules constituted 12% of the special rules 
in the 109th Congress and 13% of the special rules in the 110th Congress.  For 
the seven effectively closed rules in the 109th Congress with respect to which 
                                                          
 128 Special rules reported by the Rules Committee are not subject to amendment on the floor except in the 
rare case when the House defeats a motion to order the previous question on the rule.  See supra note 60.   
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the Rules Committee provides a record of amendments submitted to the 
committee, the effectively closed rules disallowed a total of fifty 
amendments—an average of more than seven disallowed amendments for each 
effectively closed rule.  In the 110th Congress, there were fourteen effectively 
closed rules for which the Rules Committee provided a record of submitted 
amendments.  These rules disallowed a total of 140 amendments—an average 
of ten disallowed amendments per effectively closed rule.  Even the limiting 
rules had very restrictive effects.  They often kept more than half the 
amendments submitted to the Rules Committee off the floor129 and in some 
cases disallowed dozens of amendments that members wanted to offer.130 
As would be expected, the resolutions from the Rules Committee offering 
closed rules often were contested on the House floor; nonetheless, House 
managers enjoyed outstanding success rates when the full House voted on 
closed rules.  For more than 80% of the closed rules in the 109th Congress and 
more than 94% of those in the 110th Congress, members demanded either a 
record vote or a counting of the yeas and nays, whether on ordering the 
previous question for the rule or on its final passage.131  Nonetheless, not a 
single closed or effectively closed rule failed to pass during the 109th and 
110th Congresses (although nine in the 109th Congress and five in the 110th 
Congress were tabled by House managers).132  In short, House managers in the 
109th and 110th Congresses generally could expect the rank and file to ratify 
the closed and effectively closed rules that managers brought to the floor.133 
B. Characterizing the Closed Rules 
Close review confirms that House managers in the 109th and 110th 
Congresses used the closed rule to control the floor agenda precisely when 
                                                          
 129 E.g., infra Appendix 2-A, lines 4, 30, 80; Appendix 3-A, lines 13, 41, 64. 
 130 E.g., infra Appendix 2-A, lines 101, 104; Appendix 3-A, line 78. 
 131 See infra Appendices 2-B & 3-B.  The demand for a recorded floor vote, whether on the motion to 
order the previous question or on final passage, provides only an imperfect indicator of the controversial 
character of a special rule.  As indicated particularly in Appendix 3-B, the minority in the 110th Congress 
demanded recorded votes for the majority of all closed, effectively closed, limiting, and even open rules.  
Because special rules of any kind often waive points of order, a member may rationally vote against a special 
rule even if the member does not object to the special rule’s treatment of floor amendments.  BRYAN W. 
MARSHALL, RULES FOR WAR: PROCEDURAL CHOICE IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5 (2005); see also 
BACH & SMITH, supra note 101, at 105. 
 132 See infra Appendix 2-B, lines 12, 13, 50, 66, 104, 116, 118, 132, 134; Appendix 3-B, lines 48, 104, 
111, 171, 174. 
 133 This success rate reflects the general success that managers have on the floor with special rules, 
including limiting rules and open rules (although open rules are somewhat less likely to be challenged). 
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such control was most important.  The Republican and Democratic managers’ 
regular use of the closed rule for divisive measures allowed them to preempt 
unwanted amendments, including amendments that would have pulled 
measures away from the positions they had approved or that would have 
caused unstable coalitions to unravel on the floor.  The Republican and 
Democratic managers also used the closed rule to prevent the minority from 
drawing out floor votes when managers began to run up against the end of a 
legislative session or against a self-imposed deadline for completing their 
legislative program. 
The correspondence of closed rules to divisive measures during the 109th 
and 110th Congresses was not one-to-one.  That is, not every divisive measure 
brought to the floor had a closed rule, and not every closed rule protected a 
divisive measure.  But most of the legislative topics brought up under closed 
rules in the 109th and 110th Congresses—ranging from the war in Iraq and 
flag desecration to oil exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and 
permanent repeal of the estate tax—readily stand out as controversial matters 
that marked significant policy differences within the House.  In those cases, the 
closed rule allowed managers to bring their selected version of a measure to 
the floor without any threat that it would be changed by floor amendments. 
Both the Republican and the Democratic managers regularly called up 
measures concerning national security, the military, and immigration under 
closed rules.  In the 109th Congress, Republican managers used closed rules 
for measures supporting military operations in Iraq,134 declaring that “the 
United States will prevail in the Global War on Terror and the struggle to 
protect freedom from the terrorist adversary,”135 supporting anti-terrorism 
intelligence and law-enforcement programs,136 expressing the “sense of the 
House” on the fifth anniversary of September 11, 2001,137 and endorsing 
military recruiters’ access to colleges and universities.138  On the highly 
charged matter of immigration, Republican managers brought four separate 
measures—the Secure Fence Act of 2006,139 the Border Tunnel Prevention Act 
of 2006,140 the Community Protection Act of 2006,141 and the Immigration 
Law Enforcement Act of 2006142—to the floor under closed rules. 
                                                          
 134 H.R. Res. 619, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 135 H.R. Res. 868, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 136 H.R. Res. 896, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 137 H.R. Res. 996, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 138 H.R. Res. 59, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 139 H.R. Res. 1002, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 140 H.R. Res. 1018, 109th Cong. § 1 (2006).  
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Once Democrats took control of the House in the 110th Congress, their 
new managers also used the closed rule to prevent floor amendments on these 
subjects.  Thus, Democratic managers brought to the floor under closed rules a 
measure disapproving of President George W. Bush’s “troop surge” in Iraq143 
and two measures providing for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq.144  
Democratic managers also used closed rules for other measures affecting the 
military145 and for the 2008 amendments to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (which, among other matters, granted telecommunications 
companies immunity from civil liability for their cooperation in the federal 
government’s “warrantless wiretapping” program).146 
In both Congresses, managers brought up measures concerning social 
issues, public health and welfare, and governmental operations under closed 
rules.  In the 109th Congress, Republican managers used an effectively closed 
rule for consideration of the Broadcast Indecency Act of 2005, which increased 
sanctions for indecent television broadcasts (the measure was prompted by the 
notorious halftime program at Super Bowl XXXVIII).147  Republican 
managers wrote closed rules for two measures concerning possible federal 
intervention in the matter of Theresa Schiavo, an incapacitated Florida woman 
whose family was locked in a bitter dispute over removal of her life support.148  
Republican managers also used an effectively closed rule for floor 
consideration of a constitutional amendment banning desecration of the U.S. 
flag149 and closed rules for the Marriage Protection Amendment150 and the 
Veterans’ Memorials, Boy Scouts, Public Seals, and Other Public Expressions 
of Religion Protection Act of 2006.151 
Democratic managers brought corresponding measures to the floor under 
closed rules during the 110th Congress.  Thus, managers used closed rules for 
measures to provide the District of Columbia with voting representation in the 
House,152 a measure on hate crimes,153 a measure on “lobbying 
                                                                                                                                      
 141 Id. § 2. 
 142 Id. § 3. 
 143 H.R. Res. 157, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007). 
 144 H.R. Res. 533, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007); H.R. Res. 387, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007). 
 145 H.R. Res. 601, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007); H.R. Res. 387, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007).  
 146 H.R. Res. 1285, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 147 H.R. Res. 95, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 148 H.R. Res. 182, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 162, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 149 H.R. Res. 330, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 150 H.R. Res. 918, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 151 H.R. Res. 1038, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 152 H.R. Res. 317, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 260, 110th Cong. (2007).  
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transparency,”154 a measure on paid parental leave for federal employees,155 a 
measure on employment of persons with disabilities,156 and measures on stem-
cell research,157 Medicare,158 children’s health insurance,159 and insurance 
coverage for mental health and addiction.160  Democratic managers also used 
closed rules for floor consideration of measures citing two officials in 
President Bush’s Administration for contempt of Congress and authorizing the 
Judiciary Committee to pursue litigation against them.161 
Republican and Democratic managers relied on the closed rule to protect 
potentially unstable compromises negotiated between legislators and interest 
groups.  Managers know that, even if the content of a measure is not inherently 
divisive, a compromise made at the pre-floor stages might unravel if floor 
amendments begin to modify particular parts of the deal.  The closed rule 
forecloses that possibility by disallowing any amendments once the 
compromise measure has left the direct control of House managers.  The 
credible promise—or threat—that a measure will come to the floor under a 
closed rule encourages interest groups to negotiate with managers during the 
pre-floor stages and signals that neither side will be able to repudiate the deal 
by means of a floor amendment. 
Thus, managers of both parties brought almost every tax measure to the 
floor during the 109th and 110th Congresses under closed and effectively 
closed rules.  Tax legislation can often be divisive and, in any event, often 
entails complex compromises struck between the Ways and Means Committee 
and interest groups.162  The closed rule protects those compromises.  In the 
109th Congress, only one amendment was permitted for the Death Tax Repeal 
Permanency Act of 2005,163 and no amendments were permitted for the 
Pension Protection Act of 2005,164 the 527 Reform Act of 2005,165 the 
                                                                                                                                      
 153 H.R. Res. 364, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 154 H.R. Res. 437, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 155 H.R. Res. 1277, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 156 H.R. Res. 1299, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 157 H.R. Res. 464, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 158 H.R. Res. 594, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 159 H.R. Res. 774, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 160 H.R. Res. 1014, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 161 H.R. Res. 982, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 162 ROBINSON, supra note 50, at 44−45. 
 163 H.R. Res. 202, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 164 H.R. Res. 602, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 165 H.R. Res. 755, 109th Cong. (2006). 
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Permanent Estate Tax Relief Act of 2006,166 the Estate Tax and Extension of 
Tax Relief Act of 2006,167 or the Pension Protection Act of 2006.168  In the 
110th Congress, no amendments were allowed for the Estimated Tax Safe 
Harbor Act,169 the AMT Relief Act of 2007,170 the Taxpayer Assistance and 
Simplification Act of 2008,171 the Emergency Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Act of 2008,172 the Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 
2008,173 or the Renewable Energy and Job Creation Tax Act of 2008.174  In 
that Congress, Democratic managers allowed only one floor amendment each 
for the Temporary Tax Relief Act of 2007175 and the Renewable Energy and 
Energy Conservation Tax Act of 2008.176 
Managers in the 109th and 110th Congresses also used closed rules to 
protect compromise legislation that pitted interest groups directly against each 
other.  In the 109th Congress, Republican managers used closed and 
effectively closed rules for measures addressing bankruptcy reform,177 small 
businesses,178 energy production,179 refinery permitting,180 oil exploration in 
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,181 and tort reform.182  In the 110th 
Congress, Democratic managers used closed and effectively closed rules for 
measures addressing equal pay for women,183 commodities-market reform,184 
consumer protection,185 economic assistance to the domestic automobile 
industry,186 and several measures addressing renewable energy.187 
                                                          
 166 H.R. Res. 885, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 167 H.R. Res. 966, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 168 H.R. Res. 966, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 169 H.R. Res. 317, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 170 H.R. Res. 861, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 171 H.R. Res. 1102, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 172 H.R. Res. 1265, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 173 H.R. Res. 1297, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 174 H.R. Res. 1501, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. Res. 1502, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 175 H.R. Res. 809, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 176 H.R. Res. 1001, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 177 H.R. Res. 211, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 178 H.R. Res. 379, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 179 H.R. Res. 481, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 180 H.R. Res. 842, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 181 H.R. Res. 835, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 182 H.R. Res. 508, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 183 H.R. Res. 579, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 184 H.R. Res. 1449, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 185 H.R. Res. 1476, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 186 H.R. Res. 1534, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 187 H.R. Res. 1212, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. Res. 1433, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. Res. 66, 110th Cong. 
(2007); H.R. Res. 615, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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Appropriations measures provide an instructive counterpoint.  Unlike zero-
sum legislation such as bankruptcy reform and consumer protection that 
confers gains on one interest group and imposes corresponding losses on 
another interest group, appropriations measures often simply distribute 
government largesse.  In many cases, an appropriation made for the benefit of 
a particular group does not require or precipitate an offsetting reduction in an 
appropriation made for the benefit of another group.  Additionally, lawmakers 
of both parties rely on the pork-barrel opportunities presented by 
appropriations measures to promote their incumbency.  Thus, House managers 
have little reason to shield appropriations measures from floor amendments, 
and managers normally call them up on the floor with open rules.  In fact, 
resolutions bringing appropriations measures to the floor accounted for twenty 
of the twenty-three open rules in the 109th Congress and twelve of the twenty-
three open rules in the 110th Congress.188 
House managers during the 109th and 110th Congresses also used the 
closed rule to exercise temporal agenda control.  As each Congress drew to a 
close, managers relied more heavily on closed and effectively closed rules.  
The last fifteen special rules in the 109th Congress and twenty-one of the last 
twenty-five special rules in that Congress were closed.  In the 110th Congress, 
the last eleven special rules and twenty-six of the last thirty-three special rules 
were closed or effectively closed.  With the constitutional time limit on each 
Congress approaching, the closed rule allowed managers to conserve the floor 
time available for the remaining items on the majority’s legislative program.  
Amendments offered by the minority—even those that the majority could 
safely defeat on the floor—would have presented problems for the majority if 
they had consumed too much floor time and thereby had prevented the 
majority from bringing up measures that it otherwise could have passed.189 
                                                          
 188 In the 109th Congress, the following resolutions provided open rules for appropriations measures: H.R. 
Res. 151; H.R. Res. 287; H.R. Res. 291; H.R. Res. 298; H.R. Res. 303; H.R. Res. 314; H.R. Res. 315; H.R. 
Res. 337; H.R. Res. 341; H.R. Res. 342; H.R. Res. 725; H.R. Res. 818; H.R. Res. 821; H.R. Res. 830; H.R. 
Res. 832; H.R. Res. 836; H.R. Res. 851; H.R. Res. 865; H.R. Res. 877; and H.R. Res. 890.  In the 110th 
Congress, the following resolutions provided open rules for appropriations measures: H.R. Res. 473; H.R. Res. 
480; H.R. Res. 481; H.R. Res. 498; H.R. Res. 514; H.R. Res. 517; H.R. Res. 547; H.R. Res. 558; H.R. Res. 
562; H.R. Res. 581; H.R. Res. 596; and H.R. Res. 1384.   
 189 House managers used the closed rule to exercise temporal agenda control again at the end of the first 
session of the 111th Congress.  On the morning of December 16, 2009, the Rules Committee reported House 
Resolution 976, setting forth closed rules for four separate measures.  H.R. Res. 976, 111th Cong. (2009).  The 
resolution, which was approved by the floor the same day, allowed consideration of the four measures before 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi left Washington to participate in the final hours of an international meeting in 
Copenhagen regarding global warming.  Tory Newmyer, House Dashes for the Finish; Leaders Aim to Exit 
Tonight, ROLL CALL, Dec. 16, 2009, at 1. 
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Managers likely considered temporal agenda control to be particularly 
important at the end of the 109th Congress and the beginning of the 110th 
Congress.  The 109th Congress wound down during a lame-duck session held 
after the Democrats won a majority of House seats for the 110th Congress.  
Not surprisingly, all three special rules reported by the Rules Committee 
during that period—the last opportunity for the Republican managers to push 
their legislative program—were closed rules.190  By comparison, the new 
Democratic Speaker of the House had designated the beginning of the 110th 
Congress as the “100 Hours” during which she promised passage of six 
prominent measures from the new majority’s legislative program.191  
Recalling, no doubt, their own efforts to obstruct the Republican majority’s 
enactment of the “Contract with America” during the first “100 Days” of the 
104th Congress,192 the Democratic managers directed the Rules Committee to 
report closed rules193 for two of the measures, one concerning interest rates on 
student loans194 and the other concerning clean energy.195  The other four 
measures—implementing the recommendations from the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,196 increasing the federal 
minimum wage,197 providing for stem-cell research,198 and requiring the 
federal government to negotiate the prices of prescription drugs purchased 
through Medicare199—were brought to the floor pursuant to House Resolutions 
5 and 6.200  Although not reported by the Rules Committee, those resolutions 
provided that none of the four measures could be amended on the floor.  Thus, 
the new Democratic managers brought every item on their “100 Hours” 
program to the floor under closed rules or the equivalent of closed rules.  By 
blocking all floor amendments, the managers ensured that they would meet 
their self-imposed but short time limit for passage of the six measures. 
                                                          
 190 H.R. Res. 1092, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. Res. 1100, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. Res. 1105, 109th 
Cong. (2006). 
 191 Victor H. Fazio, It’s Really About ’08, Nancy, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2007, at B1; “100-Hour” Agenda 
Is Completed, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2007, at A6. 
 192 OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 128. 
 193 H.R. Res. 65, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 66, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 194 H.R. 5, 110th Cong. (2007).   
 195 H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 196 H.R. 1, 110th Cong. (2007).  
 197 H.R. 2, 110th Cong. (2007).  
 198 H.R. 3, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 199 H.R. 4, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 200 H.R. Res. 5, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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C. Assessing the Closed Rules 
The review set out above suggests several points about the use of the closed 
rule in the 109th and 110th Congresses.  Specifically, it appears reasonably 
clear that the Republican managers of the 109th Congress and the Democratic 
managers of the 110th Congress used the closed rule in substantially the same 
way, that the closed rule imposed genuine constraints on the floor activities of 
the rank and file, and that the closed rule gave managers broad discretionary 
control over the spatial and temporal agenda of the House.  The claim made 
here is not that the review conclusively proves these points; rather, the claim is 
that the review supports these points as reasonable characterizations of the 
House legislative process during these two Congresses. 
1. Similar Use by Republicans and Democrats 
The record in the 109th and 110th Congresses confirms that managers from 
both parties have established the closed rule as a routine element of the 
legislative process.  Although the minority Republicans bitterly resented the 
Democrats’ increased reliance on the closed rule throughout the 1980s,201 they 
quickly learned to appreciate its usefulness when they gained control of the 
House in the mid-1990s.202  And, in perfect balance, the Democrats first 
denounced the closed rule during the period of Republican hegemony203 but 
then rediscovered its virtues once they recovered their status as the majority 
party.204  Thus, the distribution of closed and effectively closed rules was 
similar across the 109th and 110th Congresses.  Under the Republicans, 38% 
of special rules were closed, and 12% were effectively closed;205 under the 
Democrats, 41% of special rules were closed, and 13% were effectively 
closed.206 
Additionally, Republican and Democratic managers used the closed rule for 
similar types of measures.  Often, the measures addressed ideological or 
otherwise divisive legislative subjects, such as the continuation of military 
action in Iraq, federal funding of stem-cell research, or oil exploration in the 
Arctic.  In other cases, the measures set out compromises among competing 
                                                          
 201 Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The Decline of Deliberative Democracy in the 
House and Proposals for Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 321, 355–58 (1994). 
 202 See, e.g., SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 29. 
 203 Id.; supra note 15, at 171–72. 
 204 See Appendix 3-A. 
 205 See supra Table 3. 
 206 See supra Table 4. 
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interest groups and their legislative allies, and the closed rule was used to 
protect those compromises from unraveling on the floor.  By contrast, non-
divisive measures—such as those naming a post office,207 condemning the use 
of prison labor in the People’s Republic of China,208 honoring a deceased 
president,209 or congratulating the winner of the college football championship 
game210—did not require the protection of the closed rule.  Managers also set 
aside the closed rule when the House opened up its pork barrel during the 
appropriations process: most appropriations measures considered on the House 
floor during the 109th and 110th Congresses were brought up under open rules 
allowing any member to offer any amendment. 
There is little reason to think that the similar use of the closed rule in the 
109th and 110th Congresses is an aberration.  Rather, these parallel records 
appear to reflect what has become a normal legislative procedure in the House: 
regular use of the closed rule for the most divisive legislative measures.211  
Although broad use of the closed rule originated with the Democratic 
managers of the 1980s and was initially tagged by the Republican minority as 
an abuse peculiar to the Democratic majority,212 the subsequent management 
of the House floor first by the Republican majority and then by the 
reestablished Democratic majority confirms that regular use of the closed rule 
is now a practice of House managers qua managers.  Heavy use of the closed 
rule no longer aligns with party identity. 
2. Constraints Imposed by the Closed Rule 
It also appears reasonably clear that the constraints imposed by the closed 
rule during the 109th and 110th Congresses were genuine—that the closed rule 
had real “bite” on the amending activity of the rank and file.  The sincerity and 
strength of members’ preferences regarding disallowed floor amendments 
cannot be ascertained directly.213  However, several aspects of the record from 
                                                          
 207 See, e.g., H.R. 3770, 109th Cong. (2006) (recorded vote number 576). 
 208 H.R. Con. Res. 294, 109th Cong. (2005) (recorded vote number 647). 
 209 H.R. Res. 15, 110th Cong. (2007) (recorded vote number 21). 
 210 H.R. Res. 39, 110th Cong. (2007) (recorded vote number 25). 
 211 See, e.g., Solomon & Wolfensberger, supra note 201, at 356 (“It seems that the most important and 
controversial bills are the most likely to be considered under highly restrictive rules.”). 
 212 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 30, at 44–45 (describing the Republican minority’s protest against closed 
and other restrictive rules); Solomon & Wolfensberger, supra note 201, at 355–58 (noting that Republicans 
generally believed there were too many limitations on floor amendments in 1993). 
 213 See SMITH, supra note 30, at 12, 169 (explaining that “gathering systematic data on members’ policy 
preferences over many issues and years is not possible” and that “even if such a complex analysis were 
feasible, its conclusions still could be quite misleading”). 
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the 109th and 110th Congresses strongly imply that the use of the closed rule 
was not superfluous or irrelevant—that it did not operate simply to prevent 
rank-and-file members from offering amendments about which they had only 
weak preferences. 
First, it appears that reporting a closed rule had the effect of disallowing a 
very large number of amendments.  The Rules Committee usually did not 
make publicly available the amendments that members submitted for measures 
that received closed rules, but the committee often rejected many or even most 
of the amendments that members submitted for measures that received limiting 
rules.214  The unrestricted amending activity that rank-and-file members 
otherwise would have pursued on the measures covered by closed rules should 
have been comparable to the unrestricted amending activity that those 
members otherwise would have pursued on measures covered by limiting 
rules.  Thus, the record on specific amendments disallowed by the limiting 
rules implies that the closed rules preempted as many as several dozen 
amendments for each measure. 
Second, the record of amendments disallowed by limiting rules suggests 
that the closed rules likely blocked substantial numbers of amendments from 
both parties.  In the 109th Congress, limiting rules allowed about 28% of the 
amendments submitted by the Democratic minority and about 47% of the 
amendments submitted by the Republican majority; in the 110th Congress, 
limiting rules allowed about 20% of the amendments submitted by the 
Republican minority and about 42% of the amendments submitted by the 
Democratic majority.215  Although the low numbers of amendments allowed on 
the minority side are unremarkable, the limiting rules in both Congresses 
disallowed more than half the amendments submitted on the majority side.216 
Again, if one assumes that the blocked amending activity for measures covered 
by limiting rules provides a fair indication of the blocked amending activity for 
measures covered by closed and effectively closed rules, it appears that the 
closed and effectively closed rules in the 109th and 110th Congresses cut 
sharply against all members of the rank and file, whether in the minority or the 
majority. 
                                                          
 214 See Appendices 2-A & 3-A. 
 215 Author’s calculations from amendment records provided by the Rules Committee. 
 216 Interestingly, bipartisan amendments fared much better in both Congresses: in the 109th Congress, just 
over 50% of amendments with bipartisan sponsorship were allowed by limiting rules; in the 110th Congress, 
about 56% of such amendments were allowed. 
DORAN GALLEYSFINAL 10/5/2010  8:13 AM 
1400 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
Third, the minority’s protests about closed and effectively closed rules 
during these two Congresses make little sense unless those rules precluded 
amendments that members sincerely wanted to offer.  Just as Republicans had 
complained about the closed rule throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, 
Democrats denounced the closed rule throughout the years of Republican 
control, including during the 109th Congress.217  And, of course, Republicans 
again found the closed rule strongly objectionable during the 110th 
Congress.218  The consistency of minority complaint about the closed rule as an 
abuse of the majority’s power suggests that the closed rule was highly effective 
in disallowing amendments that reflected members’ genuine policy 
preferences. 
3. Discretionary Agenda Control 
The experiences in the 109th and 110th Congresses demonstrate not only 
that the Republican and Democratic managers used the closed rule to exercise 
control over the spatial and temporal agenda on the House floor but also that 
the rank and file conferred substantial discretionary authority on the managers 
to decide when and how to use the closed rule.  In both Congresses, managers 
enjoyed very impressive success rates when they brought closed rules (and, for 
that matter, other special rules) to the House floor for ratification.  Although 
both the Republican and the Democratic managers tabled a handful of closed 
and effectively closed rules, not a single closed or effectively closed rule was 
defeated in a floor vote.219  That success rate exceeded the managers’ success 
rate in passing underlying measures.  In other words, although managers were 
highly likely to secure passage of any particular measure that they brought 
before the full House, they were still more likely to obtain ratification of the 
special rule that established the terms and conditions under which that measure 
would be considered on the floor. 
Thus, both the Republican managers in the 109th Congress and the 
Democratic managers in the 110th Congress had expansive authority to 
determine what measures could be amended on the floor and what measures 
would be closed to the amendment process.  Certainly the managers’ high 
success rates reflect their attentiveness to the preferences of the rank and 
file.220  But these rates also reflect a standing delegation of broad discretionary 
                                                          
 217 See, e.g., SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 171–72. 
 218 Supra note 18. 
 219 See Appendices 2-B & 3-B. 
 220 See SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 270. 
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authority from the rank and file to the managers: during the 109th and 110th 
Congresses, the rank and file never overturned a managerial decision to use or 
not to use the closed rule, even when the rank and file ultimately rejected the 
underlying measure that their managers put before them.  During those two 
Congresses, the Republican and Democratic managers could choose among the 
variety of special rules—from fully open to fully closed—with confidence that 
their principals very likely would ratify the choice.  That broad discretionary 
authority over the closed rule allowed managers to exercise control over the 
floor agenda precisely when such control was most important to the managers.  
The closed rule perfected their power to define the policy options that could be 
considered on the floor, to determine the time available for considering those 
options, and, consequently, to manage substantive policy outcomes. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
Explaining why Congress structures itself as it does is the domain of 
political theorists; for legal academics, the more relevant point is whether 
existing institutional structures should be reformed.  Addressing the reform 
question requires both an assessment of the systemic effects that institutional 
structures have on the development of statutory law and, more broadly, an 
evaluation of the democratic character of those structures.  To date, legal 
scholars have effectively ignored the closed rule, even though political 
theorists have long understood that the closed rule and other agenda-control 
mechanisms may determine legislative outcomes and even though many critics 
argue that the closed rule is inherently undemocratic.  Building on insights 
from political theory, this Part addresses important positive and normative 
questions about the closed rule that the legal literature has not considered. 
This Part first evaluates three positive theories of the closed rule developed 
by political scientists and then offers a different account that emphasizes the 
closed rule’s broadly managerial character.  Turning to the normative inquiry, 
this Part argues that the closed rule has several undesirable effects on the 
development of substantive statutory law, but it rejects the more serious 
criticism that the closed rule is inherently undemocratic.  Although regular use 
of the closed rule in the contemporary House reflects an institutional 
preference among the rank and file for strong internal control by House 
managers, that preference is both rational and consistent with representative 
democracy.  The House, like any legislative body, must locate its affairs along 
the continuum between chaos and control, and members of the House for good 
reason currently prefer more control and less chaos.  Curtailment or 
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elimination of the closed rule raises the prospect of sustained disequilibrium in 
the House and a diminished institutional capacity to pursue constituent 
interests.  At a minimum, the regular use of the closed rule is not inherently 
less democratic than the regular use of its polar opposite, the open rule. 
A. Managerial Agenda Control Within the House 
All else equal, the closed rule affects the allocation of power within the 
House by shifting discretionary agenda control from the floor to managers.  
Positive political theorists have tried to explain why the rank and file, who 
must approve any closed rule, would surrender their power to amend measures 
on the floor.  The theoretical accounts are rich and provocative, but they 
generally are drawn from behavior that occurred when the open rule was still 
the norm.  This section examines the accounts and generalizes them into a 
broader explanation—one recognizing that, as demonstrated in Part II, the 
House now considers one of every two controversial measures under a closed 
or effectively closed rule.221 
1. Three Theories of the Closed Rule 
Three general theories—distributive, informational, and partisan—explain 
the institutional structure of Congress, and all three specifically account for the 
closed rule.222  Although often presented as competing accounts, cogent 
analysis suggests that they are better seen as complementary.223 
                                                          
 221 Two methodological notes should be made at the outset.  First, the three theories discussed are 
grounded in detailed formal models and rigorous empirical testing, and there is no pretense here of that type of 
modeling and testing or, for that matter, of refuting any of the three theories.  Rather, the objective here is to 
offer qualifications on how the theories explain the closed rule and to suggest a different explanation that takes 
account of the points made in Part II.  Second, the three theories and the broader explanation developed in this 
Article arguably ignore the important point that internal legislative rules and structures, determined as they are 
by institutional decision processes, may reflect the same pathologies of preference aggregation that plague 
legislation generally.  For example, it may be that the current use of the closed rule reveals not a rational 
preference by a majority of the House membership but successful agenda manipulation by House managers.  
This Article brackets that concern and, rightly or wrongly, follows the lead of political theory in treating House 
rules and structures as reflecting, more or less, the aggregated preferences of the House membership. 
 222 The theories normally refer to “restrictive rules,” the term often used by political scientists to describe 
any rule that is neither open nor modified open.  See supra note 73.  The term “restrictive rules” maps onto 
what this Article calls “closed rules,” “effectively closed rules,” and “limiting rules.”  As such, these theories’ 
explanations of restrictive rules apply, a fortiori, to closed and effectively closed rules. 
 223 See Shepsle & Weingast, Positive Theories, supra note 89, at 22–23. 
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a. Distributive Theory 
Distributive theory argues that Congress organizes itself to produce 
legislative benefits, such as pork-barrel spending, valued by constituents.224  
Vote trading can yield gains from trade among members with heterogeneous 
preferences, but institutional structures are needed to facilitate both the 
formation and the enforcement of such deals.225  Distributive theory argues that 
Congress solves this problem by establishing a system of committees with 
independent jurisdictional authority over specific policy areas and by granting 
those committees procedural privileges on the floor.226  According to this 
theory, the House uses the closed rule to protect distributive deals made among 
its members.227  By blocking floor amendments, the House ensures that 
logrolls and other agreements cannot be undone by floor amendment.  Closed 
rules “deter [a] faction from tempting one of the parties to the original bargain 
to defect and support a new amendment.”228  In short, the closed rule precludes 
a member’s unilateral repudiation of a deal. 
Although other theorists have expressed skepticism,229 distributive theory 
offers a striking explanation of particular legislative structures—most notably, 
the persistence of a robust committee system.  Still, there are reasons to 
question its particular account of the closed rule.230  Empirical studies 
generally have failed to support the claim that the House imposes greater 
                                                          
 224 C. Lawrence Evans, Legislative Structure: Rules, Precedents, and Jurisdictions, 24 LEG. STUD. Q. 605, 
608–09 (1999). 
 225 Shepsle & Weingast, Positive Theories, supra note 89, at 12–13. 
 226 Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; Or, Why 
Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 143–48 (1988); see also 
Krehbiel, Spatial Models, supra note 91, at 43–44 and 160–64. 
 227 David P. Baron, A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1048 (1989) 
[hereinafter Baron, Noncooperative Theory]; Krehbiel, Spatial Models, supra note 91, at 43–44, 160–64.  
Distributive theory has also advanced the position that closed rules are more likely to lead to greater 
inefficiency in distributive legislation; that position, however, is grounded in the counter-intuitive proposition 
that legislators take into account both the benefits and the costs of distributive legislation.  David P. Baron, 
Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI., 57 (1991) 
[hereinafter Baron, Majoritarian Incentives].  For a suggestion that distributive theory’s implications for the 
closed rule may be ambiguous, see Barbara Sinclair, House Special Rules and the Institutional Design 
Controversy, 19 LEG. STUD. Q. 477, 481 (1994) [hereinafter Sinclair, House Special Rules]. 
 228 Barry R. Weingast, Fighting Fire with Fire: Amending Activity and Institutional Change in the 
Postreform Congress, in THE POSTREFORM CONGRESS 142, 161 (Roger H. Davidson ed., 1992) [hereinafter 
Weingast, Fighting Fire]. 
 229 See, e.g., KREHBIEL, INFORMATION, supra note 47, at 247–48. 
 230 Those reasons may or may not justify tagging the account as “[a]t best . . . a chronic hope.”  Keith 
Krehbiel, Restrictive Rules Reconsidered, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 919, 940 (1997) [hereinafter Krehbiel, 
Restrictive Rules]. 
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restrictions on floor amendments for distributive legislation than for non-
distributive legislation.231  Additionally, as shown in Part II, the House 
regularly used open rules for appropriations legislation during the 109th and 
110th Congresses.  Distributive legislation does take other forms, but 
appropriations measures arguably constitute the paradigmatic form of 
legislative distributive activity.  It is hard to see why, if distributive theory’s 
account were correct, the House would have considered most appropriations 
measures during the 109th and 110th Congresses under open rules and few 
non-appropriations measures under open rules.  The objective on those 
measures appears to have been precisely the opposite of what distributive 
theory predicts.  Rather than shelter those measures from floor amendments 
that might disturb pre-floor deals, the House seemingly wanted to allow as 
many members as possible to offer floor amendments and thereby participate 
in the distribution of federal funds. 
b. Informational Theory 
Informational theory argues that Congress organizes itself into committees 
so that the full membership can benefit from committee members’ investments 
in developing and maintaining policy expertise.232  This theory stands on two 
sound assumptions: first, that institutional structures are subject to the general 
principle of majoritarianism and, second, that legislators work under conditions 
of uncertainty about the relationships between legislative policy choices and 
non-legislative outcomes.233  These two assumptions yield the insight that the 
House rationally organizes itself to realize informational efficiencies.  Thus, 
the House establishes committees with independent jurisdictions so that the 
members of those committees will develop policy expertise and will provide 
policy-specific information to the full House.234 
Informational theory accounts for the closed rule as a mechanism by which 
the House can protect the incentives of its committees to gather and to reveal 
specialized information.  By precluding floor amendments, the House 
effectively commits not to exploit a committee’s revealed information to the 
                                                          
 231 KREHBIEL, INFORMATION, supra note 47, at 173–86; Krehbiel, Restrictive Rules, supra note 230, at 
932–40; Bryan W. Marshall, Explaining the Role of Restrictive Rules in the Postreform House, 27 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 61, 67–78 (2002); Sinclair, House Special Rules, supra note 227, at 484–85. 
 232 This theory is set forth throughout KREHBIEL, INFORMATION, supra note 47; see also Thomas W. 
Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 531 (1990). 
 233 KREHBIEL, INFORMATION, supra note 47, at 15–20.   
 234 Id. at 66–81; see also Shepsle & Weingast, Positive Theories, supra note 89, at 15–16.   
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committee’s disadvantage (for example, by amending a measure to strip out 
provisions conferring disproportionate benefits on the committee members’ 
constituents).235  This account argues that, “under the closed rule, the 
committee can, in effect, credibly transmit its private information to the floor 
actor” such that “neither . . . loses utility from uncertainty.”236  Thus, the 
informational theory of legislative organization accounts for the closed rule as 
a “device[] . . . chosen by the House to get the most out of its committees.”237 
There are reasons to question both the formal modeling of informational 
theory and the strength of its empirical support.238  Additionally, the precise 
relationship of informational theory to distributive theory has been disputed.239  
Nonetheless, the apparent power of the theory to explain the closed rule is 
impressive: informational theory acknowledges that the closed rule allows the 
committees of jurisdiction to exploit protection from floor amendments for 
their own advantage but simultaneously demonstrates that the full House 
rationally could judge itself better off with the closed rule than without it. 
That said, the use of the closed rule during the 109th and 110th Congresses 
raises several points about this account.  The original empirical tests 
supporting the account used data from the 98th and the 99th Congresses 
(which met from 1983 to 1987), and the tests distinguished only between open 
rules and “restrictive rules”—that is, rules that were neither open nor modified 
open.240  During the 98th and 99th Congresses, more than half the special rules 
in the House were open rules, and almost all of the remaining ones were 
                                                          
 235 KREHBIEL, INFORMATION, supra note 47, at 90–92, 97–98; see also Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith 
Krehbiel, Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
459 (1989); Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An 
Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 287 (1987) [hereinafter 
Gilligan & Krehbiel, Collective Decisionmaking]. 
 236 Krehbiel, Spatial Models, supra note 91, at 305. 
 237 KREHBIEL, INFORMATION, supra note 47, at 191. 
 238 For example, informational theory counterfactually assumes that the floor decides between a closed 
rule and an open rule before a committee reports a measure.  Gilligan & Krehbiel, Collective Decisionmaking, 
supra note 235, at 300.  For additional criticism of the formal model, see David P. Baron, Legislative 
Organization with Informational Committees, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 485 (2000); Krishna & Morgan, supra note 
118; Shepsle & Weingast, Positive Theories, supra note 89, at 24–25.  For criticism of the empirical support, 
see Douglas Dion & John D. Huber, Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules, 58 J. POL. 25, 35–
41 (1996); Marshall, supra note 231, at 67–78; Sinclair, House Special Rules, supra note 227, at 484–85.  For 
counterarguments on the empirical point, see Krehbiel, Restrictive Rules, supra note 230.  For the original 
empirical results supporting the theory’s explanation of the closed rule, see KREHBIEL, INFORMATION, supra 
note 47, at 173–91. 
 239  Gilligan & Krehbiel, Collective Decisionmaking, supra note 235, at 328; Shepsle & Weingast, 
Positive Theories, supra note 89, at 25–26. 
 240 KREHBIEL, INFORMATION, supra note 47, at 167–68. 
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restrictive.241  In the 109th and 110th Congresses, by contrast, only 16% and 
12% (respectively) of the special rules were open rules, and the remaining 84% 
and 88% (respectively) were rules that would have been considered restrictive 
under informational theory.242  There is at least a question, then, about whether 
the results obtained in the original empirical tests, using data in which fewer 
than half the special rules were restrictive, would still be obtained using data 
from the 109th and 110th Congresses, in which close to nine out of ten special 
rules were restrictive.243 
Intuitively, the experience of the closed rule in the 109th and 110th 
Congresses suggests that informational theory’s account may indeed be 
correct.  The basic insight of the account is that the House uses closed rules to 
encourage committees to develop and divulge specialized policy information.  
Legal scholars certainly can appreciate that federal statutory law has become 
more complex over the last two decades and that the complexity reflects 
increasingly intricate and sophisticated policy considerations.  It may be, then, 
that the marked movement away from open rules since the 1980s reveals that 
the House has behaved as informational theory generally predicts: With a 
greater need for policy expertise in discharging its legislative function, the 
House has expanded the incentives for committees to invest in that expertise 
and to bring it to bear on their work product by expanding the use of the closed 
rule. 
But informational theory’s explanation of the closed rule does not always 
fit.  In the 109th and 110th Congresses, for example, managers brought several 
straightforward measures to the floor under closed rules.  For example, 
managers used closed rules to stage up-or-down votes on withdrawing U.S. 
troops from Iraq, amending the Constitution to ban flag desecration, allowing 
federal funding of stem-cell research, and other measures to which the 
committee-expertise story seems orthogonal.244  The policy parameters of 
                                                          
 241 BACH & SMITH, supra note 101, at 51.  The remaining special rules did not address floor amendments.  
Id.   
 242 Mapping Krehbiel’s distinction between open and restrictive rules onto the terms used in this Article, 
the original empirical tests would be said to have separated “open rules” (as used in this Article) from all 
“closed,” “effectively closed,” and “limiting” rules (as used in this Article).  Other studies on the closed rule 
present the same methodological issue.  See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 231, at 80; Sinclair, House Special 
Rules, supra note 227, at 478. 
 243 For example, would new testing confirm that, as implied by informational theory, KREHBIEL, 
INFORMATION, supra note 47, at 165, the committees of jurisdiction in the 109th and 110th Congresses were 
significantly more specialized and heterogeneous than were the committees of jurisdiction in the 98th and 99th 
Congresses? 
 244 See Part II.B, supra. 
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those highly charged issues were well known by the full House, and committee 
specialization likely added little to the full membership’s understanding and 
deliberation.  It seems very doubtful that either managers or the rank and file 
chose to use closed rules for those measures as a way of encouraging the 
committees of jurisdiction to reveal important information to the floor.  Rather, 
other considerations must have driven the selection of those closed rules. 
c. Partisan Theory 
Partisan theory argues that the central principle of legislative organization 
is the advantage of the political party.245  Parties provide a solution to 
collective-action problems confronting individual legislators who must form 
coalitions to advance their policy preferences.246  With a membership having 
preferences that are more homogeneous than the legislature as a whole, each 
party constitutes a relatively stable coalition.247  Importantly, the majority party 
promotes the policy preferences of its membership not by controlling votes but 
by controlling the legislative agenda.248  Specifically, the majority party 
cartelizes agenda control among senior party members and exercises both 
negative agenda control—blocking measures that divide the party—and 
positive agenda control—promoting measures favored by a majority within the 
party.249  Partisan theory therefore accounts for the closed rule as an instrument 
used by cartel members to exercise negative and positive agenda control in the 
interests of the party.250  Under partisan theory, the closed rule is a “device[] 
the majority party leadership uses to advance the goals of its membership.”251  
Stated more forcefully, the closed rule is a “tool[] of the majority  
                                                          
 245 Evans, supra note 224, at 609. 
 246 COX & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA, supra note 9, at 17–18; see also GARY W. COX & 
MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (2d ed. 2007) 
[hereinafter COX & MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN].  A different version of partisan theory, 
conditional party government (which argues that party control in the legislature is contingent and generally 
increases as both the parties become more homogeneous and the party medians become more distant), has 
slightly different implications for the closed rule.  See generally Finocchiaro & Rohde, supra note 83 
(explaining implications of conditional-party-government thesis for closed rule). 
 247 COX & MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN, supra note 246, at 99–125; COX & MCCUBBINS, 
SETTING THE AGENDA, supra note 9, at 19, 23; Shepsle & Weingast, Positive Theories, supra note 89, at 18. 
 248 COX & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA, supra note 9, at 6. 
 249 Id. at 9, 19–20, 24.  
 250 Id. at 125, 146.  
 251 Sinclair, House Special Rules, supra note 227, at 483. 
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party . . . deployed to trample on minority rights”252 or simply a “weapon” that 
the majority party uses to disenfranchise the minority party on the floor.253 
Unlike distributive and informational theory, partisan theory expressly 
accounts for the high salience of political parties in Congress and credibly 
explains how and why party members form or reform legislative processes for 
their own advantage.  Perhaps because of this intuitive appeal, partisan 
theory’s explanation of the closed rule has been characterized as the 
“conventional wisdom.”254  All the same, there are reasons to question partisan 
theory’s account.  As with distributive theory and informational theory, the 
empirical evidence for partisan theory’s explanation of the closed rule is 
contested.255  Even if the existing evidence in its favor is accepted, the same 
question arises here that arises with respect to the empirical evidence for 
informational theory: would partisan theory correctly predict the low incidence 
of open rules in the 109th Congress (only 16% of all special rules) and the 
110th Congress  (only 12% of all special rules)?  It may be that the agenda-
cartelizing behavior found by partisan theory in prior Congresses was even 
stronger among the Republicans of the 109th Congress and the Democrats of 
the 110th Congress than it had been in the past, or it may be that the partisan 
theory can explain rule choice for earlier periods but not for more recent 
periods.  This question will remain open until new empirical studies are 
conducted. 
More importantly, there is a basic anomaly in partisan theory’s account of 
the closed rule.  If indeed the majority party uses its cartelized agenda control 
to advance its own interests, it seems very odd that the majority party employs 
the closed rule rather than overtly partisan limiting rules.  The closed rule 
                                                          
 252 KREHBIEL, INFORMATION, supra note 47, at 167.   
 253 COX & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA, supra note 9, at 126.  For related arguments that the 
closed rule is used by the majority party for its own advantage, see BACH & SMITH, supra note 101, at 5; 
MARSHALL, supra note 131, at 25–45, 61–85; DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM 
HOUSE 102–03, 109 (1991); SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 30, 42, 280.  Certainly 
members of the minority party have long understood the disempowering effect that the closed rule has on 
them, and they regularly complain that the closed rule effectively locks them out of the legislative process.  
See supra notes 12–18. 
 254 Keith Krehbiel, Rejoinder to ‘Sense and Sensibility,’ 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 958, 958 (1997).  
 255 For evidence supporting this explanation, see COX & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA, supra note 
9, Finocchiaro & Rohde, supra note 83, at 44–55; Sinclair, House Special Rules, supra note 227, at 485–86; 
Douglas Dion & John D. Huber, Sense and Sensibility: The Role of Rules, 41 J. POL. SCI. 945, 946–56 (1997); 
and Dion & Huber, supra note 238, at 35–41.  (Although Dion and Huber do not specifically tag their model as 
fitting within partisan theory, it is rightly regarded as such.  See Evans, supra note 224, at 628.)  For evidence 
against partisan theory’s explanation of the closed rule, see Krehbiel, Restrictive Rules, supra note 230, at 
932–36. 
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binds all members of the rank and file equally, allowing amendments neither 
from the minority party nor from the rank and file of the majority party.  One 
would expect that a majority party intent on advancing the policy objectives of 
the majority party qua majority party and on blocking the floor activity of the 
minority party qua minority party would use limiting rules that selectively 
disallow amendments offered by the minority party and that selectively allow 
those offered by the majority party.  But neither Republicans nor Democrats 
pursued that approach during the 109th or 110th Congress.  Instead, as shown 
in Part II, both Republicans and Democrats had a clear preference for the 
closed rule.  When they did use limiting rules, both Republicans and 
Democrats readily blocked more than half the amendments submitted by 
members of their own party along with most amendments submitted by 
members of the other party.  It appears that the choice to use the closed rule 
must be informed by considerations beyond simply promoting the legislative 
agenda of the majority party. 
2. The Closed Rule as Managerial Agenda Control 
None of the three accounts of the closed rule presented by political theory 
offers a precise fit.  Distributive theory’s explanation stumbles when it 
confronts the high incidence of open rules for appropriations measures; 
informational theory does not explain the use of the closed rule for technically 
simple but politically charged measures; and partisan theory cannot account for 
the strong intraparty constraints imposed by the closed rule.  Yet even if none 
of the three accounts seems entirely right, none seems entirely wrong either.  
Collectively, they suggest that the closed rule can be understood as a 
generically managerial tool that managers at times use to serve distributive, 
informational, or partisan objectives and at other times use for other purposes. 
Thus, the explanations of the closed rule provided by distributive theory, 
informational theory, and partisan theory can be expanded and generalized into 
an alternative thesis: the closed rule constitutes a mechanism of agenda control 
by House managers in their broad capacity as managers.  On this account, the 
point of the closed rule is not specifically to enforce logrolls, to enhance the 
informational efficiency of the committee system, or to promote the narrow 
interests of the majority party.  Rather, the point of the closed rule is to 
strengthen general managerial control over the floor agenda and thereby to 
provide for a House that is orderly, predictable, and productive.  Certainly the 
closed rule has many of the effects that the distributive, informational, and 
partisan theories ascribe to it.  But the argument here is that, however 
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important, those are second-order consequences made possible by the exercise 
of effective and competent managerial agenda control.  In other words, the 
closed rule is better understood not as narrowly or exclusively distributive, 
informational, or partisan.  Rather, it is better understood as broadly 
managerial. 
This thesis is grounded in, but is nonetheless more expansive than, the 
explanation of the closed rule offered by Stanley Bach and Steven Smith.  
Bach and Smith argue that managers in the House increased their use of non-
open rules to counter the rise of disorder in the House after the reforms of the 
1970s.256  However, Bach and Smith also regard the development as distinctly 
(although not exclusively) partisan.257  The same point applies to the account 
offered by Barbara Sinclair.  Although she sees the closed rule as embedded 
within the agency relationships of the House, she nonetheless specifically 
associates the closed rule with partisanship.258  As explained further in this 
section, the partisan effects of the closed rule should be seen as derivative: the 
point of the closed rule is to manage the House, not to roll the minority.  In the 
final analysis, the closed rule takes nothing from the minority that the minority 
otherwise would have in a majoritarian institution. 
The need for a certain level of managerial agenda control in the House is 
obvious.  The Constitution establishes a state of nature under which all House 
members have equal status;259 although it provides for a speaker and other 
officers, the Constitution does not confer any specific authority on them.260  As 
a decision-making institution with 435 coequal members, the House must have 
an internal structure for its proceedings because the absence of such a structure 
would make the House inefficient at best and completely ineffective at 
worst.261  To solve this problem and to create internal order, House members 
                                                          
 256 BACH & SMITH, supra note 101, at 69; see also Evans, supra note 224, at 627; Weingast, Fighting 
Fire, supra note 228, at 143. 
 257 BACH & SMITH, supra note 101, at 5, 70–71, 112; see also Evans, supra note 224, at 627.  For their 
argument about the non-exclusivity of partisan motivations, see BACH & SMITH, supra note 101, at 69, 82. 
 258 Sinclair, House Special Rules, supra note 227, at 482–83.   
 259 See SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 13 (“In a preorganizational legislative ‘state of nature,’ 
the membership as a whole possess all decision-making authority.”).  Section 5 of Article I simply states that 
the House (like the Senate) “may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.  Thus, the 
constitutional starting point is that the House has the power to determine how it will exercise its share of the 
legislative authority granted under Article I.  Consistent with this, the full membership of the House votes on 
the standing rules at the beginning of each Congress, with each member casting one vote equally weighted 
with that of every other member.   
 260 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 261 Even groups nominally committed to radical egalitarianism eventually figure that point out.  See, e.g., 
GEOFFREY HOSKING, THE FIRST SOCIALIST SOCIETY: A HISTORY OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM WITHIN 39 
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maintain a system of agency relationships under which rank-and-file members 
delegate important responsibilities and powers to managers.  These agency 
relationships inevitably confer a measure of agenda control on managers.  The 
question answered by the closed rule is how great that measure should be. 
The current ascendancy of the closed rule represents the culmination of a 
movement, begun in the late 1970s, both to increase the agenda control of 
House managers and to divide that control between the committee chairs and 
leadership.  Before the reforms of the early 1970s, most special rules were 
open.262  Even so, floor-amending activity was modest, and House managers 
normally obtained the voting outcomes that they anticipated through the less 
formal agenda-control mechanisms provided by a powerful committee 
system.263  The reforms of the 1970s enabled the rank and file to reclaim 
discretionary legislative authority that had long been delegated to committee 
chairs, and, for several years following the reforms, they used that authority to 
exercise direct control over the House floor agenda.264  The rank and file 
substantially increased their floor-amendment activity,265 and the result was a 
markedly less orderly, less predictable, and less productive House.  Measures 
brought to the floor often bogged down in numerous amendments; floor time 
for debate and voting increased; and ad hoc minority coalitions were able to 
delay and, occasionally, prevent passage of measures to which they 
objected.266  After securing the institutional reforms that they had thought 
would improve the House, the rank and file discovered that they were unable 
to discipline themselves.  Frustrations with the disarray led the rank and file in 
1979 to ask House managers to exercise greater authority over the floor.267 
The first response of managers was to move only a half step away from the 
open amendment process then prevailing in the House.  Managers began to 
                                                                                                                                      
(1992) (describing centralization of authority within 1917 Petrograd Soviet); MURRAY MORGAN, SKID ROAD: 
AN INFORMAL PORTRAIT OF SEATTLE 201 (1982) (describing centralization of authority within Seattle labor 
unions’ 1919 general strike committee). 
 262 SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 122–24. 
 263 SMITH, supra note 30, at 31; Weingast, Floor Behavior, supra note 95, at 797–98. 
 264 SMITH, supra note 30, at 24–28.  Reformers associated the closed rule, which was used sparingly, with 
the excessive power of committee chairs (most notably, the chair of the Ways and Means Committee), and the 
Democratic caucus in 1973 put sharp restrictions on the use of the closed rule.  RULES COMMITTEE HISTORY, 
supra note 11, at 216. 
 265 SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 48; SMITH, supra note 30, at 28–35. 
 266 BACH & SMITH, supra note 101, at 30–31; SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 77; SMITH, supra 
note 30, at 35–40. 
 267 BACH & SMITH, supra note 101, at 31, 33; SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 78; SMITH, supra 
note 30, at 40–45. 
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replace open rules with limiting rules that structured and bounded—but did not 
preclude—floor amendments.268  The rank and file endorsed this initially 
limited assertion of managerial control over the floor agenda.269  As managers 
became bolder and tested the limits of floor support during the 1980s and the 
1990s, they found that the rank and file were willing to allow them greater 
control over the House agenda, including tolerance for regular use of the 
closed rule.  Within three decades, then, the position occupied by the rank and 
file on agenda control became almost the polar opposite of what it had been.  
During the 1970s, the floor insisted on setting its own agenda and allowing 
almost unlimited amending activity; now, the rank and file delegate extensive 
discretionary control over the floor agenda to House managers and allow the 
managers to block amendments on half the controversial measures brought to 
the full House.  The current concentration of managerial power no doubt will 
persist until the rank and file reassert self-governance on the floor. 
The closed rule thus represents a rational (but nonetheless contingent) 
extension of the underlying agency relationships between the rank and file and 
House managers.  Even without the closed rule, managers hold substantial 
agenda-setting power.  By controlling the decisions of the Rules Committee, 
the speaker and the other members of leadership can refuse to bring an 
unprivileged measure to the floor, grant privileged status to an otherwise 
unprivileged measure, waive points of order that might otherwise derail a 
measure on the floor, and determine the time allowed for debate on a 
measure.270  The committee system allows the committees of jurisdiction, 
particularly their chairs,271 to determine the policy content of whatever 
measures the committees report.272  The additional authority to use the closed 
rule expands the power held by these managers.  By causing the Rules 
Committee to report a closed rule, the speaker and other members of leadership 
determine that the version of a measure approved by them will be put to the 
full House in an up-or-down vote, subject only to the requirement that the rank 
and file ratify the rule.  The closed rule magnifies the authority of committee 
chairs by sharply increasing the prospects that the policy decisions made 
                                                          
 268 BACH & SMITH, supra note 101, at 50–74. 
 269 SMITH, supra note 30, at 74–83. 
 270 SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 25–35. 
 271 OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 90–93; Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: Legislative 
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 245–56 (1992). 
 272 OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 81–90. 
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within the reporting committees will be the only policy decisions on the matter 
brought to a floor vote.273 
Although the explanation offered here—that the closed rule constitutes a 
mechanism of general managerial agenda control—bears a resemblance to the 
explanation provided by partisan theory, the two accounts should be 
distinguished.  According to partisan theory, the closed rule is an instrument 
for advancing the legislative program of the majority party and for 
disenfranchising the minority party.  The rank and file of the majority party 
give the leadership of the majority party the power, as the rank and file’s agent, 
to use the closed rule against the minority party, and the closed rule therefore 
operates to shift power from the minority to the majority.  By contrast, the 
argument here is that the closed rule operates principally to shift power from 
the floor—where all members have equal status under the Constitution—to 
House managers as agents of the floor.  By including the closed rule within the 
authority delegated to managers, the rank and file enlarge the power of 
managers at the expense not just of the minority but of the rank and file as a 
whole.  Within the strictly majoritarian setting of the House, the point of the 
closed rule is as much to curb the amendment activity of the majority rank and 
file as it is to curb the amendment activity of the minority. 
Partisan theory accounts for the greater use of the closed rule in the 
contemporary Congress as a function of increasing homogeneity among 
majority-party members.  More homogeneity, partisan theory argues, implies 
less divergence of positions among members of the majority party and, 
accordingly, greater tolerance by the majority rank-and-file for use of the 
closed rule.  But the record of the 109th and 110th Congresses indicates 
otherwise.  As shown above, even the limiting rules in those Congresses 
                                                          
 273 SMITH, supra note 30, at 188–95.  Even so, the committees may not have sufficient power to roll the 
floor median.  See Krehbiel, Spatial Models, supra note 91, at 280–81.  Also as one game-theoretic analysis 
argues, because the House votes on the special rule after the committee proposes a measure, “the outcome that 
would occur under the open rule acts as a constraint on the degree to which the committee can bias the 
[measure] toward its preferred outcome.”  Jeffrey S. Banks, Committee Proposals and Special Rules, 96 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8295 (1999).  Taking a different approach, Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner argue that “delay 
rules” (such as multiple-reading requirements) can be understood in part as weakening the agenda control 
otherwise exercised by committee chairs; their point is that delay rules allow the rank and file to review the 
work of committees and organize floor opposition.  Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal 
Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 568–69 (2007).  But “delay rules” (as well as many of the other 
legislative rules that Gersen and Posner describe) are routinely waived by special rules.  Although Gersen and 
Posner acknowledge the possibility that Congress might waive its own timing rules, they argue (apparently 
without having examined legislative practice) that waiver is unlikely because it “can be costly in terms of 
reputation.”  Id. at 556.  That simply mischaracterizes the practice in the contemporary House.  
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disallowed more than half the amendments offered by members of the majority 
party.274  If homogeneity itself curbed floor amendment activity as well as 
partisan theory assumes it does, there should have been many fewer 
amendments submitted to the Rules Committee by the majority rank and file, 
and it should have been possible for managers to permit many more of those 
submitted amendments to be offered on the floor. 
In fact, the shift by managers over the last twenty years from heavy reliance 
on limiting rules to heavy reliance on closed rules probably has burdened the 
rank and file of the majority more than it has burdened the minority.  Over 
40% of the limiting rules of the late 1970s and the early 1980s permitted 
amendments exclusively from the rank and file of the majority.275  Thus, the 
amendment activity of the majority was much less constrained during that 
period than was the amendment activity of the minority.  By contrast, the 
closed rules used so frequently during the 109th and 110th Congresses allowed 
no amendments from either the majority or the minority, thereby putting 
greater restraints on the majority rank and file (relative to prior practice) than 
on the minority.276  In other words, the status quo in the 1970s and the 1980s, 
which depended heavily on limiting rules, effectively bridled the amendment 
activity of the minority; the movement toward the closed rule in the 1990s and 
the 2000s bridled the amendment activity of the majority rank and file as well. 
Certainly House managers use the closed rule for partisan purposes; 
nonetheless, the closed rule is inherently managerial, not partisan.  Even a 
House without parties (perhaps legislating for the faction-free republic 
envisioned by Madison) would need managers empowered with a certain level 
of agenda control to impose order.  Such a House rationally could grant its 
managers the authority to use the closed rule; the question is only one of 
degree.  Although the minority members in the House generally feel the effects 
of the closed rule more sharply than do the majority rank and file, that does not 
render the closed rule inherently partisan.  When used, it binds all members of 
the rank and file equally.277  Put differently, the closed rule is fundamentally a 
mechanism for defining the relationship of the rank and file to their managers 
rather than one for defining the relationship of the majority party to the 
minority party. 
                                                          
 274 See Part II.C.2. 
 275 BACH & SMITH, supra note 101, at 70–71. 
 276 Arguably, the minority is better off under a closed rule than the majority rank and file.  Even though a 
closed rule blocks all floor amendments, the minority may offer a motion to recommit the underlying measure 
with instructions.  See supra note 71. 
 277 See, e.g., ROHDE, supra note 253, at 112–13. 
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3. Managerial Agenda Control and the Rank and File 
Granting managers the power to use the closed rule regularly requires the 
rank and file to surrender both their collective authority to manage the floor 
agenda directly and their individual power to offer amendments, but the rank 
and file derive compensating benefits from the arrangement.278  Most 
importantly, the rank and file ensure that the House as a whole is more orderly, 
predictable, and productive than it would be without the closed rule.  In certain 
cases, this may enable individual members to capture gains from trade, just as 
distributive theory suggests.  Furthermore, it seems highly likely that, as 
indicated by informational theory, the closed rule encourages the committees 
of jurisdiction to invest in the acquisition of policy expertise and to report 
measures informed by that policy expertise.  By strengthening the sovereignty 
of the separate committees and their chairs, the closed rule allows the 
committees to act as micro-legislatures that produce the policies they judge 
best, subject only to the possibility of a veto by the full chamber. 
That the full House derives genuine advantages from the consolidation of 
agenda control among managers explains the rank and file’s tendency to ratify 
closed rules in almost all cases.279  That point has eluded certain political 
scientists who maintain that legislative agenda control in Congress likely 
“exist[s] either in very limited forms or not at all.”280  Their argument is 
straightforward.  Manipulations of the legislative agenda by managers—for 
example, through the closed rule—generally move policy outcomes away from 
the floor median and toward the managerial median.  Therefore, the rank and 
file, in setting the institutional structure of the House, should not rationally 
confer on managers discretionary authority over the House floor agenda 
                                                          
 278 Krehbiel, Restrictive Rules, supra note 230, at 942. 
 279 Other explanations are possible as well, of course.  It may be that managers have significant 
institutional strength and that individual members are hesitant to challenge them when voting on closed rules.  
See, e.g., SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 136–37, 156.  Another possibility is that managers 
shrewdly calculate exactly how much agenda control they can exercise without suffering a reversal on the 
floor and then calibrate their decisions to use the closed rule accordingly.  See, e.g., id.  Yet another possibility 
is that managers effectively make procedural votes a point of party discipline—a possibility that is more likely 
to the extent that votes on procedure have lower salience for constituents than do votes on underlying 
measures.  ARNOLD, supra note 9, at 121, 272; COX & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA, supra note 9, at 
29.  But those explanations simply move the relevant question one step back: as a majoritarian institution, the 
full House always has the authority to curb its managers, and it rationally would do so if that were 
advantageous. 
 280 GERALD S. STROM, THE LOGIC OF LAWMAKING: A SPATIAL THEORY APPROACH 83–85 (1990).  
Mackie makes the same point in his argument that Riker overstated the importance and incidence of agenda 
control in Congress.  MACKIE, supra note 117, at 166–68. 
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because the rank and file should not institutionalize arrangements that 
generally make themselves worse off. 
But that argument ignores entirely the rational preference of the rank and 
file for order, predictability, and productivity.  By endorsing managerial power 
to use the closed rule, the rank and file trade off non-manipulated floor 
agendas (which, presumably, would produce more substantive outcomes closer 
to the floor median) against well ordered floor proceedings (which likely 
produce fewer substantive outcomes closer to the floor median).  Legislators 
may rationally prefer order, predictability, and productivity to chaos on the 
floor, even if they fully understand and anticipate that delegating discretionary 
agenda control to managers facilitates managerial agenda manipulation.281  In 
any event, the reserved authority to reject a closed rule for any particular 
measure ensures that the rank and file do not leave themselves entirely 
unprotected against managerial agenda manipulation.282 
B. Development of Substantive Policy 
Normative assessment of the closed rule must take into account how its use 
may affect the substantive policy of measures passed by the House.  Most 
prominently, the closed rule enables managers to move measures toward their 
own policy preferences; that may or may not be objectionable, depending on 
one’s view about those preferences.283  Apart from that, the closed rule has 
                                                          
 281 David P. Baron & John A. Ferejohn, Bargaining in Legislatures, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1181, 1198–
1200 (1989) (discussing reasons the legislature might choose to adopt an open or closed rule). 
 282 Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: 
THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS 51, 72–73 (Herbert F. Weisberg ed., 1986) (“[N]ot knowing how conflicts will 
shape up, now or in the future, [political agents] develop mechanisms which enable positive collective action, 
on the one hand, but which possess aspects of insurance against reneging, opportunism, and other adverse 
circumstances, on the other hand.”). 
 283 This point should not be misconstrued.  The claims made in this Article are fundamentally agnostic 
about the formation of managerial policy preferences.  That is, the claims here do not turn on whether 
managers come to a measure with strong policy preferences of their own rather than with the intent of simply 
aggregating the policy preferences of the rank and file.  The important point is that the agency relationships in 
the House commit substantial discretion to managers and allow them to exercise outsized influence over what 
policy positions are passed by the House.  Even if managers see their job as simply aggregating the rank and 
file’s preferences into a legislative product, the agenda-setting power allows the managers to determine how 
the rank and file’s preferences will be aggregated and enables the managers to ensure that the aggregated 
preferences (as determined by the managers) will have substantial advantages on the floor.  That claim is 
distinct from any claim that the managers necessarily privilege their own policy preferences over the policy 
preferences of the rank and file.  Stated differently, one can posit three sets of preferences: (1) the aggregate 
policy preferences of the rank and file, as determined by unmanaged floor voting; (2) the aggregate policy 
preferences of the rank and file, as determined by managers; and (3) the policy preferences of managers.  
Existing agency relationships and institutional structures preclude the preferences in (1) from controlling floor 
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other important effects that may be often or consistently undesirable.  First, it 
reinforces the tendency of the committee system to produce fragmented policy 
and redundant legislation.  Second, it facilitates capture of the legislative 
process by interest groups and by agents of the Executive Branch.  Third, it 
polarizes the policy options offered on the floor, thereby impeding bipartisan 
cooperation and compromise.  Each of these effects is considered below. 
1. Legislative Fragmentation and Redundancy 
The House committee system creates strong, largely autonomous 
committees with separate but often overlapping jurisdictions.284  That, in turn, 
generally leads to fragmentation of substantive policy and redundancy in 
federal statutory law.  Committees of jurisdiction can pursue their own policy 
preferences while disregarding the preferences of other committees, and 
separate committees can report measures that fail to produce a coherent whole.  
In certain cases, two or more committees with overlapping jurisdiction report 
measures that yield duplicative or even inconsistent statutes; in other cases, the 
committees report measures on a single subject that leave significant gaps in 
federal law.285  Whatever may be the advantages and disadvantages of such 
legislative fragmentation and redundancy,286 the closed rule produces more of 
both. 
Fragmentation and redundancy can be seen throughout federal 
legislation.287  Federal poverty relief, for example, is pursued through several 
non-coordinated programs.288  Three of those programs—the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (commonly known as food stamps),289 
Medicaid,290 and the earned income tax credit291—have entirely separate rules 
                                                                                                                                      
outcomes.  The claim made here is that the agency relationships—as strengthened by the closed rule—strongly 
privilege the preferences in (2).  Ultimately, the argument is indifferent as to whether the preferences in (2) do 
or do not coincide with the preferences in (3) in all or even very many cases. 
 284 See generally DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION 
(1997). 
 285 For examples involving tax and public welfare policy, see Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax and Spending 
Programs, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1197, 1204–08 (2006) (detailing how different congressional committees 
create conflicting programs aimed at alleviating poverty) and David A. Weisbach, Tax Expenditures, 
Principal–Agent Problems, and Redundancy, 84 WASH U. L. REV. 1823, 1830–36 (2006) (providing examples 
of redundancy in tax and spending programs). 
 286 See Weisbach, supra note 285, at 1843–49 (discussing benefits of redundancy). 
 287 Weingast, Fighting Fire, supra note 228, at 162. 
 288 Staudt, supra note 285, at 1197–99. 
 289 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036 (2006). 
 290 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396v (2006). 
 291 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2006). 
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for eligibility and assistance and are administered by three separate cabinet 
departments—the Department of Agriculture (food stamps), the Department of 
Health and Human Services (Medicaid), and the Treasury Department (the 
earned income tax credit).  Rather than set up a comprehensive program 
providing the poor with food, medical care, and a cash subsidy for work, 
Congress has structured each of these three programs almost as though the 
other two did not exist.  The redundancy can be attributed in part to the 
overlapping jurisdictional interests of different legislative committees.  By 
dividing federal poverty relief into three distinct programs, three separate 
House committees of jurisdiction—Agriculture, Energy and Commerce, and 
Ways and Means—can exercise independent control over it.292  Similarly, 
Congress fragments federal education policy, setting up programs administered 
and funded by the Department of Education293 but also providing an elaborate 
system of education-related tax credits, deductions, and exclusions 
administered by the Treasury Department.294  This confers jurisdictional power 
on both the Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means 
Committee.295  In these and many other areas, policy fragmentation and 
statutory redundancy allow multiple committees to claim legislative 
sovereignty over a single subject and to enjoy the power and prestige that 
attend oversight of federal programs and of the agencies that administer those 
programs.296 
                                                          
 292 STANDING RULES, supra note 22, r. X.  The Appropriations and Budget Committees also have 
jurisdiction (although less directly).  Id.  For a political-economy argument that committee jurisdiction 
entrenches legislative redundancy, see Staudt, supra note 285, at 1214–22. 
 293 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070a to 1070a-1 (2006) (Federal Pell Grant program). 
 294 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 25A (2006) (tax credit for certain education expenses); id. § 127 (tax exclusion 
for certain employer-provided education assistance); id. § 221 (tax deduction for interest on certain education 
loans).  Congress recently took a small step toward addressing the fragmentation of federal education policy.  
Section 1004(f)(1)(A) of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 requires the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Secretary of Education to “study how to coordinate the credit allowed under section 25A of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 with the Federal Pell Grant program under section 401 of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965 to maximize their effectiveness at promoting college affordability.”  Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
§ 1004(f)(1)(A), 123 Stat. 115, 315 (2009). 
 295 STANDING RULES, supra note 22, r. X.  Again, both the Appropriations and Budget Committees also 
have jurisdiction.  Id. 
 296 Consider the following example of the benefits to legislators.  When asked about his aggressive efforts 
to raise campaign contributions from businesses regulated by his committee, Representative Barney Frank, the 
chair of the Financial Services Committee, flatly replied: “Financial services companies are inclined to give to 
me because I’m chairman of the committee important to their interests.”  Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & John 
Solomon, Democrats Offer Up Chairmen for Donors; Party’s Campaigns Had Faulted GOP for “Selling 
Access,” WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2007, at A1.  Obviously, fragmentation increases the number of committee 
chairs who can seek contributions from the same interest groups. 
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The closed rule promotes legislative fragmentation by reinforcing the 
autonomy of committees and the managerial power of committee chairs.297  A 
measure brought to the floor under a closed rule generally reflects the policy 
preferences of the reporting committee and its chair, and other members who 
do not serve on the reporting committee cannot offer floor amendments to 
harmonize the measure with existing law or with the pending work of other 
committees.  For example, the Ways and Means Committee might report a 
measure providing tax credits for certain educational expenses, and those tax 
credits might duplicate direct spending programs administered by the 
Department of Education.  If the measure were brought to the floor under an 
open rule, a member (such as the chair of the Education and Labor Committee) 
could offer a floor amendment that would reduce or eliminate the duplication.  
But if the measure is brought up under a closed rule, no such amendment can 
be offered.  This represents a downside of the effect, identified by distributive 
theory and informational theory, that the closed rule has in strengthening the 
committee system. 
In theory, House leadership could reduce legislative fragmentation and 
redundancy by revising measures between committee reporting and floor 
consideration.  A committee chair normally seeks a special rule for a measure 
reported by the committee, either to make the otherwise unprivileged measure 
in order or to protect the measure from potentially fatal points of order.298  
Thus, leadership, acting through the Rules Committee, typically has leverage 
over the reporting committee and can demand changes to the measure before 
allowing the Rules Committee to report a rule for it.  For example, when three 
separate committees—Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways 
and Means—reported different versions of a measure for health-care reform in 
the summer of 2009, leadership merged the three measures into one before 
having the Rules Committee report an effectively closed rule for it.299 
But leadership generally modifies measures in this way only when different 
committees, following multiple referral, report different versions of a single 
measure.300  Fragmentation and redundancy are less likely to be mitigated 
                                                          
 297 Positive political theory supports this point.  See Arthur T. Denzau & Robert J. MacKay, Gatekeeping 
and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Voting Behavior, 27 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 740 (1983); see also Krehbiel, Spatial Models, supra note 91, at 306; Krishna & Morgan, supra note 
118, at 436; Weingast, Fighting Fire, supra note 228, at 161. 
 298 OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 125–35. 
 299 H.R. Res. 903, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 300 See, e.g., SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 21 (describing leadership 
modification following multiple referral). 
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when committees report entirely separate measures.  The Agriculture 
Committee, for example, might authorize a subsidy program to increase the 
amount of corn produced for ethanol, and the Ways and Means Committee 
might later create a tax credit for ethanol production that duplicates the 
subsidy.  Even if leadership believed that, ideally, the federal government 
should provide corn farmers with only one subsidy, leadership would be 
unlikely to demand that the Ways and Means Committee withdraw the 
proposed ethanol tax credit.  Leadership might not have the expertise to 
determine the extent to which the tax credit overlaps with the existing subsidy; 
more importantly, leadership might see little point in provoking the Ways and 
Means chair on a measure that does not, strictly speaking, require 
reconciliation with another measure.  Such a move would rightly be 
understood by the Ways and Means chair as an encroachment on the 
committee’s jurisdiction, and the chair almost certainly would fight leadership 
over the demand.301 
2. Capture of the Legislative Process 
The closed rule also facilitates capture of the legislative process by interest 
groups and by officials and agencies of the Executive Branch.  As recognized 
by distributive theory and informational theory, the closed rule strengthens 
House committees, increasing the likelihood that a measure passed by the 
House will reflect the policy preferences of whichever committee has 
jurisdiction over the measure.302  It also reduces the number of House members 
exercising direct control over the policy content of the measure.  This allows 
interest groups and Executive Branch agents to form stable, long-term 
relationships with committee chairs and other managers, and it reduces the 
chance that any deal struck with those legislators will unravel on the floor. 
Legislators often rely on outside parties for information about matters of 
legislative interest.303  Even though committee members and their professional 
                                                          
 301 Although, in this example, the chair of the Agriculture Committee might bring the policy duplication 
or discontinuity to the attention of the Rules Committee by submitting a perfecting amendment to the Ways 
and Means measure when that measure is under review, the chair of the Agriculture Committee may rationally 
determine that her long-term interests are better served by allowing the Ways and Means Committee to do as it 
pleases so that the Ways and Means Committee will not interfere with her own exercise of jurisdiction in the 
future.   
 302 See, e.g., Denzau & MacKay, supra note 297, at 759 (“Under the closed rule, . . . more sophisticated 
committee behavior, based on compromise and a careful crafting of committee bills, is shown to move 
legislative outcomes closer to the committee’s preferred outcome.”). 
 303 KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
297–300 (1986). 
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staffs have expertise about the subjects within their jurisdiction, the legislative 
function is too general for them to acquire and maintain the very detailed 
information available to interest groups and Executive Branch agents.304  
Recognizing this, legislators regularly seek the views of outside parties through 
formal mechanisms (such as public testimony) and informal mechanisms (such 
as closed-door meetings), and they often form standing relationships with those 
parties.305  Whether and to what extent interest groups and Executive Branch 
agents successfully leverage this access to capture the legislative process 
depends on the particular terms and characteristics of their dealings with 
legislators.  Nonetheless, with all other aspects of the legislative process held 
constant, the closed rule should make capture more likely. 
Most significantly, the closed rule, in conjunction with the committee 
system, reduces the number of legislators over whom outside parties must gain 
and exercise influence.  Rather than capture the entire membership—or even a 
majority of the membership—of the House, outside parties need only capture 
those managers on whom the closed rule confers discretionary authority to 
determine the policy content of legislative measures.  By channeling legislation 
through committees, the House effectively channels the lobbying activities of 
interest groups and Executive Branch agents in the first instance to the relevant 
committee chairs.  Because it prevents floor amendments, the closed rule 
minimizes the need for outside parties to deal with the floor.  Consistent with 
this, political theory predicts that the size of winning coalitions on the floor 
will be smaller under a closed rule than under an open rule.306 
Assume, for example, that the Department of Agriculture wants Congress 
to authorize a farm subsidy program that disinterested observers would regard 
as wasteful.  Assume also that, through skillful lobbying, officials from the 
department have influenced the chair of the Agriculture Committee so that the 
chair is willing to defer to the department’s opinion on the propriety of the 
program.  The committee reports a measure authorizing the department’s 
activities, including the subsidy program requested by the department.  If the 
measure comes to the floor under an open rule, members who have not been 
influenced by the department’s lobbying may remove the program from the 
measure by means of a floor amendment.  To avoid that outcome, the 
department might have to expand its lobbying to include not only members of 
the Agriculture Committee but also a coalition on the floor large enough to 
                                                          
 304 Id. at 297. 
 305 Id. at 290–94; SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 236. 
 306 Baron, Noncooperative Theory, supra note 227, at 1082. 
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defeat any unwelcome amendment.  By contrast, if the measure comes to the 
floor under a closed rule, no such amendment would be in order.  The subsidy 
program would stand or fall along with all the other programs authorized by 
the measure.  Rather than having to persuade a majority of the House that the 
wasteful program should be authorized, under the closed rule the department 
need only persuade a majority of the committee members to include the 
program in the authorizing measure. 
The combined effect of the committee system and the closed rule is to 
establish a bilateral monopoly between the managers who make policy 
decisions in the House and the interest groups and Executive Branch agents 
affected by those policy decisions.  The two sides are locked into dealing with 
each other in a series of repeated interactions.  Interest groups representing 
farmers and officials from the Department of Agriculture deal primarily with 
members of the Agriculture Committee; interest groups representing financial 
institutions and officials from the Securities Exchange Commission deal 
primarily with members of the Financial Services Committee; and parallel 
relationships exist between other interest groups and Executive Branch agents 
and other House committees.  Such repeated interactions provide a foundation 
for long-term cooperation, and, over time, the two sides may be more willing 
to trade favors to perpetuate a mutually beneficial relationship.307  Certainly 
interest groups understand this, and they target their financial contributions to 
the managers with jurisdiction over matters important to them.308  Although the 
possibility of long-term cooperation between outside parties and managers 
does not ensure that the outside parties will be successful in capturing the 
managers, it does make capture more likely.  The closed rule then insulates any 
deals between outside parties and managers from amendment on the floor.309 
In certain cases, however, the closed rule may strengthen a committee chair 
who resists capture by forcing outside parties to accept whatever terms the 
chair offers.  If a committee chair can credibly indicate that she expects a 
                                                          
 307 See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 172–74 (1994); MICHAEL TAYLOR, 
THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 66–67 (1987). 
 308 For example, as political interest in healthcare reform grew in recent years, “hospitals, insurers, and 
other medical interest groups hoping to shape the legislation to their advantage” made substantial campaign 
contributions to the Democratic chair of the Senate Finance Committee.  Dan Eggen, Industry Cash Flowed to 
Drafters of Reform; Key Senator Baucus Is a Leading Recipient, WASH. POST, July 21, 2009, at A1.   
 309 That said, interest groups and Executive Branch agents can still enjoy legislative success under open 
rules without the need to capture a majority on the floor to the extent that legislators themselves enter into 
vote-trading arrangements.  In other words, the closed rule does not provide a necessary condition for 
legislative capture. 
DORAN GALLEYSFINAL 10/5/2010  8:13 AM 
2010] THE CLOSED RULE 1423 
measure to come to the floor under a closed rule, the interest groups or 
Executive Branch agents with an interest in the measure will have to work with 
the chair on the chair’s terms.  Still, the relationships between legislators on 
one side and interest groups and Executive Branch agents on the other appear 
to be characterized more by coziness than by antagonism.  Public choice theory 
recognizes the possibility that legislators will use their positions to extract rents 
from interest groups,310 but the eagerness of legislators to confer benefits on 
those groups presents the greater concern.311  Even when dealing with the 
Executive Branch, committee chairs have incentives to give officials and 
agencies more programs, more resources, and more authority.  By enlarging 
the functions in the Executive Branch over which they exercise jurisdiction, 
committee chairs enhance their own power and prestige within Congress.  
Positive political theorists confirm that the closed rule enables the committees 
of jurisdiction to secure disproportionate benefits from the measures they 
report—benefits that they can confer on favored interest groups and Executive 
Branch agencies.312  On the whole, then, measures passed by the House with 
regular use of the closed rule should be more to the liking of interest groups 
and Executive Branch agents than they otherwise would be.313 
3. Polarization of Policy Options 
The closed rule also weakens bipartisan lawmaking.  Many observers have 
noted a general decline in cross-party cooperation and compromise in the 
contemporary House.  The popular press has repeated this observation to the 
point of banality, and both Republican and Democratic members—including 
those with long service—report that the legislative process has become more 
                                                          
 310 See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply 
to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155 (1989) (arguing that legislators use tax-reform 
proposals to extract rents from interest groups). 
 311 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 
21–33 (1991) (describing the economic theory of legislation). 
 312 See Denzau & Mackay, supra note 297; Guillaume R. Frechette, et al., Bargaining in Legislatures: An 
Experimental Investigation of Open Versus Closed Amendment Rules, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 221, 230 (2003); 
Krehbiel, Spatial Models, supra note 91, at 296.  Relatedly, political theory argues that distributive legislation 
will be more inefficient under the closed rule than under the open rule.  See generally Baron, Noncooperative 
Theory, supra note 227; Baron, Majoritarian Incentives, supra note 227. 
 313 The closed rule may also strengthen the position of the Legislative Branch as a whole relative to the 
Executive Branch.  As argued in Part III.A.2 and Part III.C, the post-reform House leans more toward disorder 
when it uses the closed rule sparingly, thereby increasing the difficulty for Congress to assert its power vis a 
vis the Executive.  To the extent that the closed rule enhances the inter-branch status and strength of Congress, 
the Executive Branch might suffer a net loss from the closed rule.  However, if agents of the Executive Branch 
are nonetheless able to capture committee chairs and other managers on a case-by-case basis, any effects the 
closed rule has in strengthening Congress would only increase the payoff to those agents. 
DORAN GALLEYSFINAL 10/5/2010  8:13 AM 
1424 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
partisan over the last two or three decades.314  More significantly, political 
scientists have substantiated the point: close observers of the House have 
documented an appreciable increase in partisan voting since the legislative 
reforms of the 1970s.315 
Regular use of the closed rule by House managers reinforces that 
movement away from bipartisan lawmaking, even if not by design.  When 
managers bring a measure to the floor under a closed rule, they offer the rank 
and file a choice between ratifying the version of the measure that managers 
have approved and retaining the status quo.  By blocking all amendments, the 
closed rule makes bipartisan compromise on the floor more difficult.  The 
claim here is not that the regular use of the closed rule by House managers 
accounts for the decline of bipartisan cooperation and compromise in the 
contemporary House.  Rather, the claim is that, with bipartisan lawmaking 
otherwise in decline, the regular use of the closed rule makes such cooperation 
and compromise even more difficult.  Partisan theory, of course, argues that, 
because the majority party uses the closed rule for partisan advantage, greater 
polarization of positions between the parties leads to more closed rules.  
Whether or not that claim is correct, it is certainly the case that greater use of 
the closed rule effectively leads to greater polarization of the positions on 
which legislators are permitted to vote. 
C. Effects on Democratic Government 
A more serious normative criticism is the charge that the closed rule is 
inherently undemocratic.  One version of this position, echoing the partisan 
theory account, considers the closed rule to be an instrument by which the 
majority stifles floor activity of the minority, thereby undermining deliberative 
lawmaking.316  As shown above, however, that position mischaracterizes the 
role of the closed rule in the contemporary House.317  Regular use of the closed 
rule binds the majority as well as the minority; it precludes floor amendments 
by all members and, as such, does not materially change the position of the 
minority within a majoritarian institution.  Stated differently, the majority 
could routinely defeat unwanted floor amendments offered by the minority 
even in the absence of the closed rule.  In the House, the floor position of the 
                                                          
 314 See, e.g., Joel Achenbach, Bipartisan?  Ha.  Congress Creates a Desert Aisle; Left-Right Divide Is 
Now a “Hyperpartisan” Chasm, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2009, at C1. 
 315 ROHDE, supra note 253, at 14–15.   
 316 See, e.g., OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 132; SMITH, supra note 30, at 44–45; Solomon & Wolfensberger, 
supra note 201, at 321–22, 349; Tiefer, supra note 120, at 259, 261; see also supra notes 12–18. 
 317 See supra Part III.A. 
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minority is weak because the majority has more members, not because the 
majority uses the closed rule. 
A stronger version of this criticism, drawing in part from the distributive 
theory and informational theory accounts, might argue that the closed rule 
undermines democratic government by centralizing discretionary agenda 
control in committee chairs and other managers.  Framed narrowly, the 
argument is that the closed rule allows managers to preempt floor amendments, 
to foreclose meaningful deliberation among the rank and file, and even to 
manipulate the floor agenda to secure passage of the managers’ policy 
preferences.318  Framed broadly, the argument would be that all mechanisms of 
agenda control—as institutional structures that induce equilibria, in the 
language of positive political theory319—frustrate democracy.  As William 
Riker put the point: “[W]hen institutional stability is imposed on what would 
otherwise be a disequilibrium of tastes, the imposed equilibrium is necessarily 
unfair.  That majority which would, were it not institutionally restrained, 
displace the current outcome is denied the opportunity to work its will.”320  If 
Riker is generally correct that institutionalized agenda control undermines 
democratic processes, the closed rule must itself be democratically suspect.321 
Without challenging Riker’s fundamental insight that nominally democratic 
institutions have very serious problems when measured against democratic 
ideals, this Part offers a qualified defense of the democratic status of the closed 
rule.  If Riker’s point about the deficiency of democratic institutions is taken as 
given, the question about the legitimacy of the closed rule can be restated as 
whether the closed rule is less democratic than the open rule.  This Part argues 
that, viewed from an ex ante perspective, even regular use of the closed rule is 
not inherently less democratic than regular use of the open rule precisely 
because of the closed rule’s broadly managerial character.  Without a 
concentration of discretionary legislative authority in managers, the activities 
of the House could quickly devolve into disorder, as they nearly have for brief 
periods in the recent past.  The closed rule and other procedural tools for 
centralizing power ensure that the full membership can function as a body.  
                                                          
 318 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 
DUKE L.J. 1277, 1300, 1304 (2001) (arguing that non-open rules preclude public deliberation). 
 319 Shepsle, supra note 91, at 35–37. 
 320 RIKER, supra note 83, at 192; see also id. at 137–39, 169–95, 200, 237. 
 321 Indeed, Mackie, one of Riker’s most prominent critics, does not even attempt to reconcile the closed 
rule to democratic ideals.  Rather, Mackie argues that Riker overstated the incidence of agenda control in 
Congress and brushes aside the closed rule on the erroneous assumption that it is “seldom invoked.”  MACKIE, 
supra note 117, at 169–71. 
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Certainly there is a tradeoff in practice: avoiding the turbulence of an entirely 
decentralized institution requires a delegation of managerial power to a subset 
of legislators, and too much managerial power threatens the democratic 
character of the House.322  The regular use of the closed rule represents a 
considered effort by the rank and file to locate floor activity at the best point 
along a continuum between comprehensive managerial control and total 
legislative chaos. 
1. The Chaos-Control Problem 
Any democratic institution must confront the twin challenges of chaos and 
control.  At one extreme, all members of a legislative body have equal 
authority, and no member or group of members has formal control over the 
institution’s process or agenda.  Any member can make any proposal at any 
time, and all questions are decided by majority vote.  But this model inevitably 
tends toward chaos, with members potentially cycling through competing 
policy options and with the institution potentially unable to approve legislative 
measures.323  At the other extreme, members delegate key powers—such as 
agenda-setting power—to managers who establish the conditions for proposing 
and considering measures.  That model inevitably tends toward dictatorial 
control, with managers potentially able to manipulate substantive outcomes. 
Both extremes challenge democratic government.  At the control extreme, 
managers exercise significantly greater influence over legislation than do the 
rank and file, and the policy preferences of managers carry greater institutional 
weight than do those of the rank and file.  At the chaos extreme, no one 
member exercises outsized power over institutional decisions, but the 
institution as a whole is less able to discharge its legislative function.  The fact 
that the House organizes its internal structure around a set of agency 
relationships does not avoid the chaos–control problem—it simply grounds it.  
The question is exactly how the agency relationships in the House strike the 
balance between too much autonomy for rank-and-file members and too much 
control for managers. 
Consider first a possible structure with weak managers.  Committees would 
produce initial drafts of legislative measures, but the measures would be 
routinely brought to the floor under open rules.  Floor amending activity would 
be robust; the decisions of the committee chairs, the speaker, and the other 
                                                          
 322 SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 17. 
 323 See supra Part I.C (discussion of Arrow’s Theorem and McKelvey’s Theorem). 
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managers would be regularly reviewed and often overturned on the floor.  Such 
a structure would have considerable advantages for the rank and file.  Each 
member would have a genuine say in setting the floor agenda, and each 
member could offer amendments to any measure.  The disadvantage of such a 
structure would be disorder on the floor.  With 435 members equally 
empowered to participate in legislative activity, floor proceedings would be 
protracted and unruly.  Controversial measures would draw numerous 
amendments—both those offered to change the policy positions in the 
measures and those offered simply to delay final passage.  Under this structure, 
it might require weeks (if not months) for the House to dispose of a single 
measure.324 
Contrast that with a possible structure having strong managers.  
Committees would report measures crafted to satisfy managers’ policy 
preferences, and all measures would come to the floor under closed rules.  The 
floor activity of the rank and file would be limited to ratifying or rejecting 
whatever was proposed by managers.  The tradeoff under this structure would 
be clear as well.  Although the House would be highly organized, predictable, 
and productive, it would be considerably more difficult for the rank and file to 
pursue their own policy preferences.  The rank and file would choose the 
managers, but the managers—not the rank and file—would choose legislative 
outcomes. 
The point here is straightforward.  The managerial structure created by the 
existing agency relationships in the House represents an institutional 
framework for addressing the chaos–control problem.  Just as representative 
government itself provides an agency-based solution to the difficulties of 
maintaining a direct democracy in the body politic, the managerial structure in 
the House provides an agency-based solution to the difficulties of maintaining 
a direct democracy among 435 otherwise coequal legislators.325  The extent of 
discretionary authority delegated to managers determines whether the House 
leans more toward chaos or more toward control, but the rank and file’s 
delegation of such authority is no more inherently undemocratic than is 
constituents’ delegation of legislative power to their elected representatives. 
                                                          
 324 SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 143. 
 325 COX & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA, supra note 9, at 9, 17–18, 24; OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 
24; SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 9; see also Fiorina & Shepsle, supra note 30, at 37. 
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2. The Closed Rule and the Chaos–Control Problem 
The closed rule represents an integral component of the rank and file’s 
effort to select what they judge to be the best point along the chaos–control 
continuum.  The rank and file understand that, by conferring broad 
discretionary authority on managers to make regular use of the closed rule, 
they surrender part of their autonomy as members, but they also understand 
that regular use of the closed rule enables the House to function effectively.  
This, of course, is a restatement of the basic proposition that the closed rule is 
one of the institutional structures allowing the House to reach equilibrium 
outcomes.326  The claim here is not that the current use of the closed rule in 
fact optimizes the tradeoff between the autonomy of individual members and 
managerial power; rather, the claim is that, in giving managers broad authority 
to make regular use of the closed rule, the rank and file aim to optimize the 
tradeoff.  In other words, the current use of the closed rule represents a 
rational, deliberate decision by the rank and file to locate the floor activity of 
the House at a particular point along the chaos–control continuum.327 
That said, the current use of the closed rule undoubtedly leans toward the 
control end of the continuum.  As shown above, half the special rules during 
the 109th and 110th Congresses were either closed or effectively closed, 
allowing managers to present up-or-down votes on many measures brought to 
the floor.328  Nonetheless, the decision to allow regular use of the closed rule 
appears rational in light of recent periods during which the House, lacking 
strong managerial control, tended more toward chaos.  The procedural reforms 
of the early 1970s encouraged extensive amending activity on the floor that led 
to a markedly less orderly, less predictable, and less productive House.  In 
response, the rank and file granted managers expanded authority over special 
rules.  Chaos briefly emerged again following the Republican takeover of the 
House in 1995.  The Republicans had chafed under closed rules in the 
minority, and the new Republican majority in 1995 pledged that it would use 
the closed rule sparingly.329  But the Democratic minority quickly 
demonstrated the case for managerial control.  As the Republicans tried to pass 
the measures constituting the “Contract with America” during the early days of 
                                                          
 326 Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 95, at 514; Shepsle, supra note 91, at 54–55. 
 327 Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 40 (2000) (arguing that courts, in following the numerus clausus 
principle, aim to optimize standardization in forms of property ownership). 
 328 See supra Part II.A. 
 329 SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 29. 
DORAN GALLEYSFINAL 10/5/2010  8:13 AM 
2010] THE CLOSED RULE 1429 
the 104th Congress, Democrats offered numerous amendments intended to 
draw floor debate out as long as possible.330  The rank and file again made a 
clear choice for control over chaos and allowed House managers to begin 
bringing up more measures under closed rules.331 
Still, the current structure does not locate the House completely at the 
control end of the continuum.  The rank and file do not give managers 
unreviewable discretion over when and how to use the closed rule.  Instead, the 
rank and file require that any closed rule be brought to the floor as a proposed 
resolution subject to debate and a vote by the full membership.  Although the 
rank and file use their authority to overrule managers’ decisions about the 
closed rule sparingly, the retained power to do so on a case-by-case basis 
remains important.  Managers cannot simply disregard the preferences of the 
rank and file regarding the availability of floor amendments. 
3. The Closed Rule and Representative Democracy 
Because the closed rule narrows the scope of permissible floor activity for 
the rank and file, it also narrows the range of legislative activity through which 
the rank and file can pursue the policy preferences of their constituents.  
Although legislators have complex motivations that inform their conduct,332 all 
members of the House must—to a greater or lesser extent—respond to 
constituent interests.  By conferring substantial discretionary authority on 
managers, the rank and file generally make themselves weaker agents of their 
constituents.  The closed rule in particular enlarges the authority of managers 
over the House floor agenda, and this results in fewer opportunities for rank-
and-file members to pursue constituent policy preferences through floor 
amendments.333  Nonetheless, this structure does not inherently undermine 
representative democracy; instead, it substitutes one version of representative 
democracy for another.  The rank and file choose to make themselves weaker 
agents of their constituents precisely so that the House will be orderly, 
predictable, and productive.334 
                                                          
 330 Id.; OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 128. 
 331 SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 280. 
 332 ARNOLD, supra note 9, at 121–22; SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 30, at 10; Garrett & Vermeule, 
supra note 318, at 1287–90; see also John W. Kingdon, Models of Legislative Voting, 39 J. POL. 563 (1977). 
 333 This proposition, of course, ignores the more fundamental problems of determining policy preferences 
of a representative’s constituents and of reconciling inconsistent preferences among those constituents.  See, 
e.g., Fiorina & Shepsle, supra note 30, at 21. 
 334 Cf. SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 284. 
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Although the closed rule generally makes it more difficult for members to 
pursue constituent policy preferences, there are important exceptions.  First, 
the closed rule increases the institutional power of members who are 
themselves managers.  A member holding a leadership position enjoys much 
more control over the House floor agenda than she would if such control were 
evenly distributed among the full membership.  Similarly, the chair of a 
committee of jurisdiction can better influence the policy content of measures 
produced by the committee than can other members.  To the extent that 
managers are otherwise inclined to advance their constituents’ policy 
preferences, the closed rule strengthens the position of managers to do so.  
Still, the point should not be overstated.  House managers are not numerous; 
only a few members occupy leadership positions, and even a committee chair 
exercises managerial control only over the work product of her particular 
committee. 
Second, even rank-and-file members do not completely lose the ability to 
pursue constituent policy preferences under the closed rule.  Rank-and-file 
members still introduce measures, participate in committee work, and vote on 
the floor.  Even on the question of setting the House floor agenda, the rank and 
file retain some control that can be exercised on behalf of their constituents.  
Specifically, rank-and-file members can vote down a closed rule, forcing 
managers to rewrite the rule; if they are truly dissatisfied with a closed rule, 
they can reject the motion for the previous question on the rule, thereby taking 
from leadership the authority to write the rule for the underlying measure. 
The important point, however, is that the control retained by the rank and 
file over the House floor agenda is only the residual authority of a principal to 
monitor its agent and to ratify or reject its agent’s decisions.  Inevitably, this 
affects the degree of constituent influence over legislative outcomes.  If the 
rank and file did not delegate such extensive agenda control to managers, 
constituents attempting to influence their representatives’ legislative actions 
would stand in a simple principal–agent relationship with the members having 
direct control over the floor agenda.  Instead, under the managerial structure in 
which the closed rule is embedded, constituents stand in a principal–agent 
relationship with members who in turn stand in a principal–agent relationship 
with the managers having direct control over the floor agenda.  Constituents 
are thus twice removed from key procedural decisions affecting—and 
sometimes determining—legislative outcomes. 
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The closed rule’s most significant effect on the constituents of rank-and-file 
members is the constituents’ diminished ability to have their representatives 
affect the policy content of measures through floor amendments.  This does not 
imply, however, that the closed rule necessarily undermines representative 
democracy.  Rather, the closed rule helps to shape a particular version of 
representative democracy—one that provides the rank and file fewer 
opportunities to advance constituent policy preferences on the floor but makes 
the House as a whole more orderly, predictable, and productive.  Again, the 
rank and file face a tradeoff when they make basic organizational decisions.  
Making the closed rule generally available expands managerial control over 
the floor, which narrows the floor activity of the rank and file and diminishes 
the direct representation of their constituents’ interests.  But prohibiting closed 
rules would result in less managerial control and greater chaos.  Although the 
rank and file would be able to offer floor amendments representing the policy 
preferences of their constituents, it would become more difficult for the House 
as a whole to move measures to final passage.335 
It is not clear, ex ante, that one of those competing institutional structures 
serves representative democracy better than the other.  At one extreme, 
bringing all measures to the floor under open rules increases the prospects that 
the rank and file’s floor activity will reflect constituent policy preferences; 
however, it may also reduce that floor activity to an exercise in futility as 
members become caught up in protracted debate and position cycling.  
Representative democracy would be poorly served by a House mired in chaos.  
At the other extreme, bringing all measures to the floor under closed rules 
enables the House to function more effectively, but it increases the likelihood 
that measures put before the rank and file will not correspond to the policy 
preferences of their constituents.  Representative democracy would also be 
poorly served by a House in which the floor activity of the rank and file is 
limited to ratifying or rejecting the policy decisions of managers. 
The degree of discretion that the rank and file confer on managers in their 
use of the closed rule helps to determine where the House locates itself 
between these two endpoints.  The rank and file in the contemporary House 
authorize regular use of the closed rule not to undermine representative 
democracy but to actualize a particular version of it—a version that is not 
inherently less legitimate than one in which no rules are closed.  Nonetheless, 
the current arrangement remains contingent on the preferences of the rank and 
                                                          
 335 Cf. OLESZEK, supra note 24, at 132; SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 279. 
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file—however well or poorly aggregated those preferences may be.  Future 
Congresses no doubt will change the equilibrium observed in recent 
Congresses, either by decreasing or even increasing managerial authority to 
use the closed rule. 
CONCLUSION 
When properly situated within its institutional and theoretical context, the 
closed rule stands out as a critical mechanism by which managers control the 
floor agenda in the House.  The closed rule allows managers to determine 
which policy positions will be considered on the floor (spatial agenda control) 
and the time allocated to each measure brought up for debate and voting 
(temporal agenda control).  Managers use this agenda control to move 
measures toward their preferred policy positions.  Although both parties object 
to the closed rule when numbered as the minority, the record in the 109th and 
110th Congresses shows that both parties now make the same use of the closed 
rule when numbered as the majority.  Specifically, both parties use closed and 
effectively closed rules for half the controversial measures brought to the floor. 
Understanding the closed rule is critical for assessing the legislative 
process.  The closed rule reinforces the strong internal agency relationships 
that the rank and file use to organize the activities of the House.  By conferring 
on managers broad discretionary control over the floor agenda, the closed rule 
strengthens both leadership and the committee chairs.  The rank and file retain 
final authority to ratify or reject managers’ decisions about when and how to 
use the closed rule, but outright rejection of a closed rule on the floor—such as 
the defeat of House Resolution 336 that angered President Reagan—is a rare 
event.  The closed rule thus bears directly and importantly on the internal 
structure of the House: it contributes significantly to the concentration of 
legislative power among a handful of members holding managerial positions 
and correspondingly weakens the institutional position of the rank and file.  
Although positive political theory locates the closed rule in specifically 
distributive, informational, and partisan theories of legislative organization, the 
closed rule is more accurately understood, by generalizing those accounts, as 
broadly managerial. 
The closed rule affects the substance of the House’s legislative product and 
the relationship between House members and their constituents.  The closed 
rule contributes to legislative fragmentation and redundancy, increases capture 
opportunities for interest groups and Executive Branch agents, and makes 
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bipartisan cooperation and compromise more difficult.  Additionally, the 
closed rule generally diminishes the ability of the rank and file to pursue 
constituent interests by preventing members from offering floor amendments 
that might move the policy content of measures closer to their constituents’ 
policy preferences.  But that is part of a considered, deliberate, and rational 
tradeoff: by allowing managers to restrict their amendment activity, the rank 
and file steer the floor safely away from the chaos that could result from a 
weaker managerial structure.  The closed rule functions within a particular 
version of representative democracy—a version in which the rank and file 
delegate substantial discretionary control over the House floor agenda to make 
the House more orderly, predictable, and productive.  Thus understood, the 
normative case against the closed rule remains doubtful. 
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APPENDIX 1 
HOUSE RESOLUTION 587—SPECIAL RULE FOR THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY 
AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009336 
Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to 
consider in the House the bill (H.R. 2454) to create clean energy jobs, achieve 
energy independence, reduce global warming pollution and transition to a 
clean energy economy.  All points of order against consideration of the bill are 
waived except those arising under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI.  In lieu of the 
amendment recommended by the Committee on Energy and Commerce now 
printed in the bill, an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the 
text of H.R. 2998, modified by the amendment printed in part A of the report 
of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution, shall be considered 
as adopted.  The bill, as amended, shall be considered as read.  All points of 
order against provisions of the bill, as amended, are waived.  The previous 
question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, as amended, and on any 
further amendment thereto to final passage without intervening motion except: 
(1) three hours of debate, with two and one-half hours equally divided and 
controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce and 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by the 
chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means; (2) 
the further amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in part B of the 
report of the Committee on Rules, if offered by Representative Forbes of 
Virginia or his designee, which shall be in order without intervention of any 
point of order except those arising under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI, shall be 
considered as read, and shall be separately debatable for 30 minutes equally 
divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent; and (3) one motion 
to recommit with or without instructions. 
                                                          
 336 H.R. Res. 587, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted). 
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APPENDIX 2-A 
RESOLUTIONS REPORTED BY THE 
RULES COMMITTEE IN THE 109TH CONGRESS 
Rule Designations: 
C – Closed Rule 
EC – Effectively Closed Rule 
L – Limiting Rule 
O – Open Rule 















1. 42 109-1 L 3 3 
2. 59 109-2 C  0 
3. 71 109-3 X  n/a 
4. 75 109-4 L 20 5 
5. 95 109-6 EC 5 1 
6. 96 109-7 EC  1 
7. 125 109-10 EC 6 2 
8. 126 109-11 EC 12 3 
9. 140 109-14 L 34 10339 
10. 144 109-15 L 34 12340 
11. 151 109-18 O  All 
12. 154 109-19 L 22 4 
13. 162 109-20 C  0 
14. 163 109-21 X  n/a 
15. 181 109-27 X  n/a 
16. 182 109-28 C  0 
17. 202 109-35 EC  1 
18. 211 109-43 C  0 
19. 219 109-43 L 89 30 
                                                          
 337 This designation generally includes resolutions that provide the terms of floor debate, waive standing 
rules, make in order motions to suspend the rules, or provide for consideration of a conference report.  It does 
not, however, include resolutions that provide for consideration of Senate measures or Senate amendments to 
House measures; because those resolutions sometimes allow floor amendments, they are included among the 
resolutions designated as closed, effectively closed, limiting, or open rules.  Cf. KREHBIEL, INFORMATION, 
supra note 47, at 166 (excluding such resolutions from consideration). 
 338 The Rules Committee makes available summaries of amendments submitted for some, but not all, 
measures.   
 339 House Resolutions 140 and 144 set forth rules for a single underlying measure; together, they allow 22 
of the 34 amendments submitted to the Rules Committee for that measure.  See H.R. Res. 140, 109th Cong. 
(2005); H.R. Res. 144, 109th Cong. (2005).   
 340 House Resolutions 140 and 144 set forth rules for a single underlying measure; together, they allow 22 
of the 34 amendments submitted to the Rules Committee for that measure. See H.R. Res. 140; H.R. Res. 144. 
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20. 235 109-55 C  0 
21. 236 109-56 EC 11 2 
22. 241 109-59 C  0341 
23. 242 109-60 X  n/a 
24. 248 109-63 X  n/a 
25. 254 109-69 EC 8 3 
26. 255 109-70 O 3 All 
27. 258 109-73 X  n/a 
28. 268 109-76 L 26 10 
29. 269 109-77 L 13 5 
30. 278 109-83 L 89 24 
31. 287 109-87 O  All 
32. 291 109-94 O  All 
33. 293 109-96 L 85 29 
34. 298 109-97 O  All 
35. 303 109-105 O  All 
36. 304 109-106 C  0 
37. 314 109-122 O  All 
38. 315 109-127 O  All 
39. 319 109-132 L 29 28 
40. 330 109-140 EC  1 
41. 331 109-141 EC 10 1 
42. 334 109-144 L 11 5 
43. 337 109-148 O  All 
44. 341 109-155 O  All 
45. 342 109-156 O  All 
46. 345 109-159 X  n/a 
47. 346 109-160 L 7 7 
48. 351 109-163 C, C, 
C, C 
 0342 
49. 365 109-175 L 68 39 
50. 369 109-178 L 63 20 
51. 370 109-179 L 9 6 
52. 379 109-183 EC  1 
53. 380 109-184 L 12 4 
54. 385 109-185 C  0 
55. 386 109-186 C  0 
56. 387 109-187 C  0 
57. 392 109-198 X  n/a 
58. 393 109-199 X  n/a 
59. 394 109-200 X  n/a 
60. 395 109-201 X  n/a 
                                                          
 341 House Resolution 241 is a self-executing rule providing that, upon its adoption, House Resolution 240 
is itself adopted.  H.R. Res. 241, 109th Cong. (2005).  House Resolution 241 is counted as a closed rule 
because it does not permit any floor amendment to House Resolution 240.  Id. 
 342 House Resolution 351 provides closed rules for four separate measures. See H.R. Res. 351, 109th 
Cong. (2005). 
DORAN GALLEYSFINAL 10/5/2010  8:13 AM 














61. 396 109-202 X  n/a 
62. 399 109-212 X  n/a 
63. 400 109-214 X  n/a 
64. 401 109-214 C  0 
65. 426 109-217 X  n/a 
66. 436 109-219 O  All 
67. 439 109-221 C  0 
68. 440 109-222 O  All 
69. 451 109-227 L 8 5 
70. 455 109-229 L 25 12 
71. 462 109-236 L 50 12 
72. 468 109-238 X  n/a 
73. 469 109-239 C  0 
74. 470 109-240 EC 12 2 
75. 474 109-242 X  n/a 
76. 481 109-245 EC  1 
77. 493 109-248 C  0 
78. 494 109-249 L 6 5 
79. 508 109-253 EC  2 
80. 509 109-254 L 28 9 
81. 520 109-257 X  n/a 
82. 527 109-266 L 15 11 
83. 532 109-270 X  n/a 
84. 538 109-277 X  n/a 
85. 539 109-278 X  n/a 
86. 540 109-279 L  9 
87. 542 109-281 C  0 
88. 558 109-301 C  0343 
89. 558 109-301 L 6 5344 
90. 559 109-302 X  n/a 
91. 560 109-303 C  0 
92. 563 109-306 X  n/a 
93. 564 109-308 X  n/a 
94. 565 109-309 X  n/a 
95. 572 109-312 C  0 
96. 583 109-328 C  0 
97. 588 109-330 EC  1 
98. 595 109-343 X  n/a 
99. 596 109-344 X  n/a 
100. 602 109-346 C  0 
101. 610 109-347 L 131 15345 
                                                          
 343 The Rules Committee reported two separate resolutions numbered 558 for two separate measures.  The 
resolution referenced here sets forth a closed rule for H.R.J. Res. 72, 109th Cong. (2005), a continuing 
resolution for fiscal year 2006.   
 344 The Rules Committee reported two separate resolutions numbered 558 for two separate measures.  The 
resolution referenced here sets forth a limiting rule for H.R. 1065, 109th Cong. (2005), the United States 
Boxing Commission Act.   
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102. 619 109-348 C  0 
103. 620 109-349 X  n/a 
104. 621 109-350 L 131 21346 
105. 623 109-355 X  n/a 
106. 631 109-357 X  n/a 
107. 632 109-358 X  n/a 
108. 639 109-361 X  n/a 
109. 640 109-363 X  n/a 
110. 653 109-366 C  0 
111. 654 109-367 X  n/a 
112. 702 109-381 X  n/a 
113. 710 109-386 L 11 6 
114. 713 109-387 L 25 15 
115. 725 109-391 O  All 
116. 741 109-399 L 103 15347 
117. 742 109-401 L 103 8348 
118. 755 109-404 C  0 
119. 766 109-405 X  n/a 
120. 767 109-406 X  n/a 
121 774 109-438 L 25 6 
122. 783 109-441 L 74 9 
123. 789 109-450 L 34 15 
124. 805 109-458 X  n/a 
125. 806 109-459 L 55 8349 
126. 810 109-460 X  n/a 
127. 811 109-461 L 55 23350 
128. 815 109-466 X  n/a 
129. 816 109-467 L 4 4 
130. 817 109-468 EC 22 3 
                                                                                                                                      
 345 House Resolutions 610 and 621 set forth rules for a single underlying measure; together, they allow 36 
of the 131 amendments submitted to the Rules Committee for that measure.  See H.R. Res. 610, 109th Cong. 
(2005); H.R. Res. 621, 109th Cong. (2005).   
 346 House Resolutions 610 and 621 set forth rules for a single underlying measure; together, they allow 36 
of the 131 amendments submitted to the Rules Committee for that measure.  See H.R. Res. 610, 109th Cong. 
(2005); H.R. Res. 621, 109th Cong. (2005).   
 347 House Resolutions 741 and 742 set forth rules for a single underlying measure; together, they allow 23 
of the 103 amendments submitted to the Rules Committee for that measure.  See H.R. Res. 741, 109th Cong. 
(2006); H.R. Res. 742, 109th Cong. (2006).   
 348 House Resolutions 741 and 742 set forth rules for a single underlying measure; together, they allow 23 
of the 103 amendments submitted to the Rules Committee for that measure.  See H.R. Res. 741, 109th Cong. 
(2006); H.R. Res. 742, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 349 House Resolutions 806 and 811 set forth rules for a single underlying measure; together, they allow 31 
of the 55 amendments submitted to the Rules Committee for that measure.  See H.R. Res. 806, 109th Cong. 
(2006); H.R. Res. 811, 109th Cong. (2006).   
 350 House Resolutions 806 and 811 set forth rules for a single underlying measure; together, they allow 31 
of the 55 amendments submitted to the Rules Committee for that measure.  See H.R. Res. 806, 109th Cong. 
(2006); H.R. Res. 811, 109th Cong. (2006).   
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131. 818 109-469 O  All 
132. 821 109-472 O  All 
133. 830 109-477 O  All 
134. 832 109-479 O  All 
135. 835 109-480 C  0 
136. 836 109-481 O  All 
137. 842 109-482 C  0 
138. 849 109-487 L 7 7 
139. 850 109-491 L 27 8 
140. 851 109-492 O  All 
141. 862 109-498 X  n/a351 
142. 862 109-498 X  n/a352 
143. 865 109-501 O  All 
144. 868 109-502 C  0 
145. 877 109-507 O  All 
146. 878 109-516 EC  2 
147. 885 109-517 C  0 
148. 886 109-518 C  0 
149. 890 109-529 O  All 
150. 891 109-530 L 24 16 
151. 896 109-539 C  0 
152. 897 109-540 L 21 5 
153. 906 109-530 L 3 2 
154. 907 109-551 EC 3 1 
155. 910 109-554 L  4 
156. 918 109-573 C  0 
157. 920 109-577 L 4 3 
158. 924 109-578 C  0 
159. 925 109-579 C  0 
160. 939 109-595 C 3 0 
161. 946 109-598 X  n/a 
162. 947 109-599 L 10 6 
163. 951 109-602 X  n/a 
164. 952 109-603 L 24 6 
165. 958 109-606 X  n/a 
166. 966 109-613 C, C  0353 
167. 981 109-642 L 9 7 
168. 996 109-646 C  0 
169. 997 109-647 L 9 5 
170. 1002 109-653 C  0 
                                                          
 351 The Rules Committee reported two separate resolutions numbered 862 for two separate measures.  The 
resolution referenced here waives a procedural rule in the standing rules.  See H.R. Res. 862, 109th Cong. 
(2006). 
 352 The Rules Committee reported two separate resolutions numbered 862 for two separate measures.  The 
resolution referenced here provides for consideration of a conference report.  Id. 
 353 House Resolution 966 provides closed rules for two separate measures.  See H.R. Res. 966, 109th 
Cong. (2006). 
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171. 1003 109-654 C  0354 
172. 1015 109-670 C  0 
173. 1018 109-671 C, C, C  0355 
174. 1037 109-677 X  n/a 
175. 1038 109-678 C  0 
176. 1039 109-679 C  0 
177. 1042 109-688 C  0 
178. 1045 109-690 X  n/a 
179. 1046 109-691 X  n/a 
180. 1047 109-692 C  0 
181. 1054 109-701 C, C  0356 
182. 1062 109-703 X  n/a 
183. 1092 109-718 C  0 
184. 1093 109-719 X  n/a 
185. 1100 109-723 C  0 
186. 1101 109-724 X  n/a 
187. 1105 109-727 C  0 
 
                                                          
 354 House Resolution 1003 is a self-executing rule providing that, upon its adoption, House Resolution 
1000 is itself adopted.  H.R. Res. 1003, 109th Cong. (2006).  House Resolution 1003 is counted as a closed 
rule because it does not permit any floor amendment to House Resolution 1000.  Id. 
 355 House Resolution 1018 provides closed rules for three separate measures.  See H.R. Res. 1018, 109th 
Cong. (2006).   
 356 House Resolution 1054 provides closed rules for two separate measures.  See H.R. Res. 1054, 109th 
Cong. (2006). 
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1. 42 L No Passed 
2. 59 C No Passed 
3. 75 L Yes Passed 
4. 95 EC No Passed 
5. 96 EC No Passed 
6. 125 EC No Passed 
7. 126 EC Yes Passed 
8. 140 L No Passed 
9. 144 L No Passed 
10. 151 O No Passed 
11. 154 L Yes Passed 
12. 162 C — Laid on Table 
13. 182 C — Laid on Table 
14. 202 EC No Passed 
15. 211 C Yes Passed 
16. 219 L No Passed 
17. 235 C No Passed 
18. 236 EC No Passed 
19. 241 C Yes Passed 
20. 254 EC No Passed 
21. 255 O No Passed 
22. 268 L No Passed 
23. 269 L No Passed 
24. 278 L Yes Passed 
25. 287 O No Passed 
26. 291 O No Passed 
27. 293 L Yes Passed 
28. 298 O No Passed 
29. 303 O No Passed 
30. 304 C No Passed 
31. 314 O No Passed 
32. 315 O No Passed 
33. 319 L No Passed 
                                                          
 357 A resolution is designated as “yes” if there was a recorded vote either on the motion to order the 
previous question or on passage of the resolution. 
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34. 330 EC No Passed 
35. 331 EC No Passed 
36. 334 L Yes Passed 
37. 337 O No Passed 
38. 341 O No Passed 
39. 342 O Yes Passed 
40. 346 L No Passed 
41. 351 C, C, 
C, C 
Yes Passed 
42. 365 L Yes Passed 
43. 369 L Yes Passed 
44. 370 L No Passed 
45. 379 EC No Passed 
46. 380 L No Passed 
47. 385 C Yes Passed 
48. 386 C Yes Passed 
49. 387 C Yes Passed 
50. 401 C — Laid on Table 
51. 436 O No Passed 
52. 439 C Yes Passed 
53. 440 O No Passed 
54. 451 L Yes Passed 
55. 455 L Yes Passed 
56. 462 L Yes Passed 
57. 469 C No Passed 
58. 470 EC Yes Passed 
59. 481 EC Yes Passed 
60. 493 C No Passed 
61. 494 L Yes Passed 
62. 508 EC No Passed 
63. 509 L Yes Passed 
64. 527 L Yes Passed 
65. 540 L Yes Passed 
66. 542 C — Laid on Table 
67. 558 C Yes Passed 
68. 558 L Yes Passed 
69. 560 C No Passed 
70. 572 C Yes Passed 
71. 583 C No Passed 
72. 588 EC No Passed 
73. 602 C Yes Passed 
74. 610 L Yes Passed 
75. 619 C Yes Passed 
76. 621 L Yes Passed 
77. 653 C Yes Passed 
78. 710 L No Passed 
79. 713 L No Passed 
80. 725 O Yes Passed 
81. 741 L Yes Passed 
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82. 742 L Yes Passed 
83. 755 C Yes Passed 
84. 774 L Yes Passed 
85. 783 L Yes Passed 
86. 789 L Yes Passed 
87. 806 L Yes Passed 
88. 811 L Yes Passed 
89. 816 L No Passed 
90. 817 EC Yes Passed 
91. 818 O Yes Passed 
92. 821 O Yes Passed 
93. 830 O Yes Passed 
94. 832 O Yes Passed 
95. 835 C Yes Passed 
96. 836 O Yes Passed 
97. 842 C Yes Passed 
98. 849 L No Passed 
99. 850 L Yes Passed 
100. 851 O No Passed 
101. 865 O Yes Passed 
102. 868 C Yes Passed 
103. 877 O Yes Passed 
104. 878 EC — Laid on Table 
105. 885 C Yes Passed 
106. 886 C Yes Passed 
107. 890 O Yes Passed 
108. 891 L No Passed 
109. 896 C Yes Passed 
110. 897 L Yes Passed 
111. 906 L Yes Passed 
112. 907 EC No Passed 
113. 910 L No Passed 
114. 918 C No Passed 
115. 920 L Yes Passed 
116. 924 C — Laid on Table 
117. 925 C Yes Passed 
118. 939 C — Laid on Table 
119. 947 L Yes Passed 
120. 952 L Yes Passed 
121. 966 C, C Yes Passed 
122. 981 L Yes Passed 
123. 996 C Yes Passed 
124. 997 L No Passed 
125. 1002 C Yes Passed 
126. 1003 C Yes Passed 
127. 1015 C Yes Passed 
128. 1018 C, C, 
C 
Yes Passed 
129. 1038 C Yes Passed 
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130. 1039 C Yes Passed 
131. 1042 C Yes Passed 
132. 1047 C — Laid on Table 
133. 1054 C, C Yes Passed 
134. 1092 C — Laid on Table 
135. 1100 C Yes Passed 
136. 1105 C No Passed 
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1. 65 110-1 C  0 
2. 66 110-2 C  0 
3. 86 110-3 EC  1 
4. 116 110-6 C  0 
5. 133 110-9 O  All 
6. 157 110-12 C  0 
7. 161 110-13 X  n/a 
8. 195 110-25 O  All 
9. 203 110-26 EC 16 3 
10. 214 110-31 O  All 
11. 215 110-32 O  All 
12. 219 110-34 C  0 
13. 229 110-36 L 24 6 
14. 242 110-49 EC 8 2 
15. 254 110-53 L 13 7 
16. 260 110-63 C 15 0 
17. 261 110-64 C  0 
18. 269 110-73 C  0 
19. 270 110-74 L 19 8 
20. 274 110-78 L 27 12 
21. 275 110-79 EC 22 3 
22. 301 110-96 O  All 
23. 302 110-97 L 6 3 
24. 317 110-98 C, C  0360 
                                                          
 358 This designation generally includes resolutions that provide the terms of floor debate, waive standing 
rules, make in order motions to suspend the rules, or provide for consideration of a conference report.  It does 
not, however, include resolutions that provide for consideration of Senate measures or Senate amendments to 
House measures; because those resolutions sometimes allow floor amendments, they are included among the 
resolutions designated as closed, effectively closed, limiting, or open rules.  Cf. KREHBIEL, INFORMATION, 
supra note 47, at 166 (excluding such resolutions from consideration). 
 359 The Rules Committee makes available summaries of amendments submitted for some, but not all, 
measures.   
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25. 318 110-99 L 3 3 
26. 319 110-100 L 25 6 
27. 327 110-105 L 3 2 
28. 330 110-108 L 6 4 
29. 331 110-109 O  All 
30. 332 110-110 X  n/a 
31. 348 110-116 L 22 12 
32. 349 110-117 O  All 
33. 350 110-118 L 8 5 
34. 364 110-120 C  0 
35. 370 110-121 C  0 
36. 377 110-130 C  0 
37. 382 110-136 L 46 21 
38. 383 110-137 L 15 8 
39. 387 110-143 C, C, C  0361 
40. 388 110-144 L 16 10 
41. 403 110-151 L 135 50 
42. 404 110-152 O  All 
43. 409 110-156 X  n/a 
44. 429 110-165 L 3 3 
45. 437 110-167 C, L n/a, 48 0, 5362 
46. 438 110-168 EC  2 
47. 453 110-174 L 15 11 
48. 464 110-179 C  0 
49. 465 110-180 C  0 
50. 473 110-184 O  All 
51. 480 110-189 O  All 
52. 481 110-190 O  All 
53. 498 110-199 O  All 
54. 502 110-201 EC 23 3 
55. 514 110-211 O  All 
56. 517 110-213 O  All 
57. 531 110-224 EC 27 1 
58. 533 110-226 C  0 
59. 534 110-227 L 23 6 
60. 547 110-235 O  All 
61. 558 110-242 O  All 
62. 562 110-255 O  All 
63. 567 110-260 X  n/a 
64. 574 110-261 L 112 31 
65. 579 110-263 C  0 
                                                                                                                                      
 360 House Resolution 317 provides closed rules for two separate measures.  See H.R. Res. 317, 110th 
Cong. (2007).   
 361 House Resolution 387 provides closed rules for three separate measures.  See H.R. Res. 387, 110th 
Cong. (2007).   
 362 House Resolution 437 provides a closed rule for one measure and a limiting rule for a separate 
measure.  See H.R. Res. 437, 110th Cong. (2007).   
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66. 580 110-264 C  0 
67. 581 110-265 O  All363 
68. 594 110-285 C  0 
69. 595 110-286 X  n/a 
70. 596 110-287 O  All 
71. 597 110-288 X  n/a 
72. 599 110-290 L  11364 
73. 600 110-291 X  n/a 
74. 601 110-292 C  0 
75. 602 110-293 X  n/a 
76. 613 110-298 X  n/a 
77. 614 110-299 X  n/a 
78. 615 110-300 L, C 117, 11 23, 0365 
79. 633 110-316 O  All 
80. 636 110-319 L 14 5 
81. 637 110-320 X  n/a 
82. 650 110-330 L 10 7 
83. 659 110-332 X  n/a 
84. 660 110-333 EC 5 2 
85. 664 110-335 L 23 8 
86. 675 110-346 C  0 
87. 677 110-346 C  0 
88. 678 110-349 L 2 2 
89. 682 110-350 L 3 3 
90. 683 110-351 L 26 13 
91. 701 110-358 L 6 5 
92. 702 110-359 L 6 3 
93. 703 110-360 C  0 
94. 704 110-361 C  0 
95. 719 110-368 C  0 
96. 720 110-369 L 15 8 
97. 724 110-371 L 10 4 
98. 741 110-382 C  0 
99. 742 110-383 L 2 1 
100. 746 110-385 C  0 
101. 763 110-403 L 1 1 
102. 764 110-404 L 1 1 
103. 765 110-405 C  0 
104. 773 110-407 L 14 10 
105. 774 110-408 C  0 
106. 780 110-416 L 26 7 
                                                          
 363 House Resolutions 581 and 599 set forth separate rules for a single underlying measure.  See H.R. Res. 
581, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 599, 110th Cong. (2007).   
 364 House Resolutions 581 and 599 set forth separate rules for a single underlying measure.  See H.R. Res. 
581, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 599, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 365 House Resolution 615 provides a limiting rule for one measure and a closed rule for a separate 
measure.  See H.R. Res. 615, 110th Cong. (2007).   
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107. 781 110-417 EC  1 
108. 793 110-422 EC 7 3 
109. 794 110-427 X  n/a 
110. 801 110-432 C  0 
111. 802 110-433 O  All 
112. 806 110-435 X  n/a 
113. 809 110-438 EC  1 
114. 813 110-440 X  n/a 
115. 817 110-447 X  n/a 
116. 818 110-448 C  0 
117. 824 110-449 C  0 
118. 825 110-450 L 24 18 
119. 839 110-471 X  n/a 
120. 846 110-474 C  0 
121. 849 110-475 C  0 
122. 850 110-476 X  n/a 
123. 859 110-487 X  n/a 
124. 860 110-488 X  n/a 
125. 861 110-489 C  0 
126. 862 110-490 C  0 
127. 869 110-492 C  0 
128. 873 110-493 X  n/a 
129. 876 110-495 X  n/a 
130. 877 110-496 C  0 
131. 878 110-497 C  0 
132. 893 110-498 C, C  0366 
133. 894 110-499 C  0 
134. 918 110-508 L 4 4 
135. 922 110-509 L 8 7 
136. 940 110-519 EC 7 2 
137. 941 110-520 X  n/a 
138. 955 110-522 X  n/a 
139. 956 110-523 L 61 27 
140. 974 110-524 L 4 2 
141. 976 110-525 C  0 
142. 982 110-526 C, C  0367 
143. 983 110-527 X  n/a 
144. 1001 110-530 EC  1 
145. 1014 110-538 C  0 
146. 1015 110-539 L 15 11 
147. 1031 110-547 C  0368 
                                                          
 366 House Resolution 893 provides closed rules for two separate measures.  See H.R. Res. 893, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
 367 House Resolution 982 is a self-executing rule providing that, upon its adoption, House Resolutions 979 
and 980 are adopted.  H.R. Res. 982, 110th Cong. (2008).  House Resolution 982 is counted as two closed 
rules because it does not permit a separate vote on any floor amendments to House Resolution 979 or House 
Resolution 980.  Id. 
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148. 1036 110-548 EC 22 3 
149. 1041 110-549 C  0 
150. 1065 110-562 L 11 4 
151. 1071 110-563 L 4 3 
152. 1083 110-572 O  All 
153. 1084 110-573 L 28 8 
154. 1092 110-574 X  n/a 
155. 1102 110-585 C  0 
156. 1103 110-586 L 7 4 
157. 1107 110-590 L 13 4 
158. 1125 110-603 L 23 17 
159. 1126 110-604 L 38 15 
160. 1156 110-612 C  0 
161. 1157 110-613 EC 7 2 
162. 1167 110-614 X  n/a 
163. 1174 110-621 L 16 7 
164. 1175 110-622 EC  3 
165. 1189 110-629 X  n/a 
166. 1190 110-630 C  0 
167. 1197 110-636 EC  3 
168. 1212 110-660 C  0 
169. 1213 110-661 X  n/a 
170. 1214 110-662 X  n/a 
171. 1218 110-666 L 128 58 
172. 1233 110-677 L 1 1 
173. 1234 110-678 L 30 8 
174. 1253 110-703 L 21 8 
175. 1257 110-707 L 18 12 
176. 1265 110-710 C  0 
177. 1276 110-717 EC 11 2 
178. 1277 110-718 EC 3 1 
179. 1281 110-719 X  n/a 
180. 1284 110-720 EC  1 
181. 1285 110-721 C  0 
182. 1297 110-731 C  0 
183. 1298 110-732 C 5 0 
184. 1299 110-733 C  0 
185. 1304 110-734 L 21 5 
186. 1317 110-744 EC 5 2 
187. 1318 110-745 C  0 
188. 1339 110-758 L 17 4 
189. 1343 110-759 L 20 7 
190. 1344 110-760 L 21 11 
191. 1350 110-761 X  n/a 
                                                                                                                                      
 368 House Resolution 1031 is a self-executing rule providing that, upon its adoption, House Resolution 
895 is itself adopted.  H.R. Res. 1031, 110th Cong. (2008).  House Resolution 1031 is counted as a closed rule 
because it does not permit a separate vote on any floor amendments to House Resolution 895.  Id. 
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192. 1362 110-766 C  0 
193. 1363 110-767 C  0 
194. 1367 110-368 X  n/a 
195. 1368 110-369 X  n/a 
196. 1384 110-800 O  All 
197. 1388 110-807 L 16 6 
198. 1389 110-808 X  n/a 
199. 1399 110-816 X  n/a 
200. 1419 110-834 EC 9 3 
201. 1433 110-853 C  0 
202. 1434 110-852 EC  1 
203. 1441 110-854 L 15 5 
204. 1449 110-859 C  0 
205. 1476 110-867 C  0 
206. 1488 110-875 C  0 
207. 1489 110-876 X  n/a 
208. 1490 110-879 X  n/a 
209. 1491 110-880 X  n/a 
210. 1500 110-883 X  n/a 
211. 1501 110-884 C  0 
212. 1502 110-887 C  0 
213. 1503 110-888 X  n/a 
214. 1507 110-891 C  0 
215. 1514 110-897 X  n/a 
216. 1516 110-902 C, C  0369 
217. 1517 110-903 C  0 
218. 1525 110-907 C  0 
219. 1526 110-908 X  n/a 
220. 1533 110-918 X  n/a 
221. 1534 110-922 EC  1 
                                                          
 369 House Resolution 1516 provides closed rules for two separate measures.  See H.R. Res. 1516, 110th 
Cong. (2008). 
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1. 65 C Yes Passed 
2. 66 C Yes Passed 
3. 86 EC Yes Passed 
4. 116 C Yes Passed 
5. 133 O No Passed 
6. 157 C Yes Passed 
7. 195 O No Passed 
8. 203 EC Yes Passed 
9. 214 O No Passed 
10. 215 O No Passed 
11. 219 C Yes Passed 
12. 229 L Yes Passed 
13. 242 EC Yes Passed 
14. 254 L Yes Passed 
15. 260 C Yes Passed 
16. 261 C Yes Passed 
17. 269 C Yes Passed 
18. 270 L Yes Passed 
19. 274 L Yes Passed 
20. 275 EC Yes Passed 
21. 301 O Yes Passed 
22. 302 EC No Passed 
23. 317 C, C Yes Passed 
24. 318 L Yes Passed 
25. 319 L No Passed 
26. 327 L Yes Passed 
27. 330 L Yes Passed 
28. 331 O No Passed 
29. 348 L Yes Passed 
30. 349 O No Passed 
31. 350 L Yes Passed 
32. 364 C Yes Passed 
33. 370 C Yes Passed 
                                                          
 370 A resolution is designated as “yes” if there was a recorded vote either on the motion to order the 
previous question or on passage of the resolution. 
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34. 377 C Yes Passed 
35. 382 L Yes Passed 
36. 383 L Yes Passed 
37. 387 C, C, C Yes Passed 
38. 388 L Yes Passed 
39. 403 L Yes Passed 
40. 404 O Yes Passed 
41. 429 L Yes Passed 
42. 437 C, L Yes Passed 
43. 438 EC Yes Passed 
44. 453 L Yes Passed 
45. 464 C Yes Passed 
46. 465 C Yes Passed 
47. 473 O Yes Passed 
48. 480 O — Laid on Table 
49. 481 O No Passed 
50. 498 O No Passed 
51. 502 EC Yes Passed 
52. 514 O No Passed 
53. 517 O Yes Passed 
54. 531 EC Yes Passed 
55. 533 C Yes Passed 
56. 534 L No Passed 
57. 547 O Yes Passed 
58. 558 O Yes Passed 
59. 562 O Yes Passed 
60. 574 L Yes Passed 
61. 579 C Yes Passed 
62. 580 C Yes Passed 
63. 581 O Yes Passed 
64. 594 C Yes Passed 
65. 596 O No Passed 
66. 599 L Yes Passed 
67. 601 C Yes Passed 
68. 615 L, C Yes Passed 
69. 633 O Yes Passed 
70. 636 L Yes Passed 
71. 650 L Yes Passed 
72. 660 EC Yes Passed 
73. 664 L Yes Passed 
74. 675 C Yes Passed 
75. 677 C Yes Passed 
76. 678 L Yes Passed 
77. 682 L Yes Passed 
78. 683 L Yes Passed 
79. 701 L Yes Passed 
80. 702 L Yes Passed 
81. 703 C Yes Passed 
82. 704 C Yes Passed 
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83. 719 C Yes Passed 
84. 720 L Yes Passed 
85. 724 L Yes Passed 
86. 741 C Yes Passed 
87. 742 L Yes Passed 
88. 746 C Yes Passed 
89. 763 L Yes Passed 
90. 764 L Yes Passed 
91. 765 C Yes Passed 
92. 773 L Yes Passed 
93. 774 C Yes Passed 
94. 780 L Yes Passed 
95. 781 EC Yes Passed 
96. 793 EC Yes Passed 
97. 801 C Yes Passed 
98. 802 O Yes Passed 
99. 809 EC Yes Passed 
100. 818 C Yes Passed 
101. 824 C Yes Passed 
102. 825 L Yes Passed 
103. 846 C Yes Passed 
104. 849 C — Laid on Table 
105. 861 C Yes Passed 
106. 862 C Yes Passed 
107. 869 C Yes Passed 
108. 877 C Yes Passed 
109. 878 C Yes Passed 
110. 893 C, C No Passed 
111. 894 C — Laid on Table 
112. 918 L Yes Passed 
113. 922 L No Passed 
114. 940 EC No Passed 
115. 956 L Yes Passed 
116. 974 L Yes Passed 
117. 976 C Yes Passed 
118. 982 C, C Yes Passed 
119. 1001 EC Yes Passed 
120. 1014 C Yes Passed 
121. 1015 L Yes Passed 
122. 1031 C Yes Passed 
123. 1036 EC Yes Passed 
124. 1041 C Yes Passed 
125. 1065 L Yes Passed 
126. 1071 L No Passed 
127. 1083 O Yes Passed 
128. 1084 L Yes Passed 
129. 1102 C Yes Passed 
130. 1103 L Yes Passed 
131. 1107 L Yes Passed 
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132. 1125 L Yes Passed 
133. 1126 L Yes Passed 
134. 1156 C No Passed 
135. 1157 EC Yes Passed 
136. 1174 L Yes Passed 
137. 1175 EC Yes Passed 
138. 1190 C Yes Passed 
139. 1197 EC Yes Passed 
140. 1212 C Yes Passed 
141. 1218 L Yes Passed 
142. 1233 L Yes Passed 
143. 1234 L Yes Passed 
144. 1253 L Yes Passed 
145. 1257 L Yes Passed 
146. 1265 C Yes Passed 
147. 1276 EC Yes Passed 
148. 1277 EC Yes Passed 
149. 1284 EC Yes Passed 
150. 1285 C No Passed 
151. 1297 C Yes Passed 
152. 1298 C Yes Passed 
153. 1299 C Yes Passed 
154. 1304 L Yes Passed 
155. 1317 EC Yes Passed 
156. 1318 C Yes Passed 
157. 1339 L Yes Passed 
158. 1343 L Yes Passed 
159. 1344 L Yes Passed 
160. 1362 C Yes Passed 
161. 1363 EC Yes Passed 
162. 1384 O Yes Passed 
163. 1388 L Yes Passed 
164. 1419 EC Yes Passed 
165. 1433 C Yes Passed 
166. 1434 EC Yes Passed 
167. 1441 L Yes Passed 
168. 1449 C Yes Passed 
169. 1476 C Yes Passed 
170. 1488 EC Yes Passed 
171. 1501 C — Laid on Table 
172. 1502 C Yes Passed 
173. 1507 C Yes Passed 
174. 1516 C, C — Laid on Table 
175. 1517 EC Yes Passed 
176. 1525 C Yes Passed 
177. 1534 EC Yes Passed 
 
